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LIMITED LIABILITY FOR
CORPORATE SHAREHOLDERS:
MYTH OR MATTER-OF-FACT*
By RUTHEFORD B. CAMPBELL**
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the most important and firmly entrenched concepts
of modern corporate law is the concept of limited liability.' The
digests abound with ringing phrases granting the owners of
corporations immunity from liability beyond their initial in-
vestment.2 There are, however, numerous cases in which the
courts have denied the owners of corporations the protection of
limited liability and have held the owners liable for an obliga-
tion incurred by the corporation. It is the purpose of this paper
to examine the theories under which the owners of corporations
have been held liable for the contractual obligation of corpora-
tions.
I1. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF LIMITED LIABILITY
In their classic work, Pollock & Maitland stated that
"I elvery system of law that has attained a certain degree of
maturity seems compelled by the ever-increasing complexity of
human affairs to create persons who are not men . . . and to
regulate their rights and duties."'3 This "created person", or
corporation, appears to have had its genesis in the Roman
* This author wishes to express appreciation to two fine law students for their help
in the preparation of this paper. They are Jacob Perry Cline I and Stephen L. Barker.
While "boilerplate" expressions of thanks are common to published articles, these two
deserve more. Both worked hard; both have the ability and judgment of quality law-
yers.
** Associate Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. B.A. 1966, Centre College;
J.D. 1969, University of Kentucky; LL.M. 1971, Harvard University.
I See, e.g., N. BUTLER, WHY SHOULD WE CHANGE OUR FORM OF GOVERNMENT? 82
(1912) where he states: "I weigh my words when I say that in my judgment the limited
liability corporation is the greatest single discovery of modem times. . . .Even steam
and electricity are far less important than the limited liability corporation, and they
would be reduced to comparative unimportance without it."
2 E.g., Renault, Inc. v. Marble, 317 F.2d 265 (10th Cir. 1963); Adelstein v. Jeffer-
son Bank & Trust Co., 377 S.W.2d 247 (Mo. 1964).
1 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 486 (2d ed. 1968).
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Empire.4 The Roman "corporations" had many of the charac-
teristics of modern corporations, including the right to sue and
be sued in a common name, the right to hold property in the
common name and the power to adopt by-laws.' The existence
of limited liability, however, seems less clear. Although Profes-
sor Berle concluded that the Roman corporation "apparently
achieved limited liability", 6 there has been as much scholarly
support for the opposite position. Oscar and Mary F. Handlin
have written that "there was no clear precedent from Roman
law [for limited liability] . . . ."I They dismissed opinion to
the contrary as merely a misinterpretation of the distinction
between individual and corporate obligations.'
It is also unclear whether early English corporate law af-
forded the owners of a corporation limited liability.' The best
evidence available, however, indicates that the concept of lim-
ited liability was not an inherent characteristic of the 17th
century English corporation.'0 Blackstone, in enumerating
"powers. . . necessarily and inseparably incident to every cor-
poration", did not list limited liability as a characteristic.,'
Other scholars, jurists, and commentators also omitted the
I See, e.g., C. ABBOTT, RISE OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION 20 (1936); W. BLACK-
STONE, COMMENTARIES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 498 (Chitty ed. 1832).
5 A. BERLE, STUDIES IN THE LAW OF CORPORATE FINANCE 3 (1928). Berle also made
the interesting observation that the Roman corporations, at least initially, were not
created by the state and the state had nothing to do with them. Later, however, during
the time of the late pagan emperors, fear of a plot against the throne resulted in a
licensing requirement for the corporation. Id. at 3. See also J. GOEBEL, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 536-51 (1937); Timberg,
Corporate Fictions, 46 COLUM. L. REV. 533, 554 (1946).
6'Id.
I Handlin & Handlin, Origins of the American Business Corporation, 5 J. OF ECON.
HISTORY 10 (1945).
Id. at n.52. See also Williston, History of Business Corporations Before 1800, 2
HARV. L. REV. 105, 160 (1888) wherein he stated that "in the Roman law it seems that
if the corporation became insolvent the persons constituting it were obliged to contrib-
ute their private fortunes .. "
I It is interesting to note that there is little evidence that the development of
corporate law in England was influenced by the Roman experience. See W. HURST, THE
LIGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION 2 (1970).
m See, e.g., Williston, supra note 8, at 160-61.
'W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 5, at 475-76. The characteristics that are listed
include: "1. To have perpetual sucession . . . . 2. To sue or be sued. . . . 3. To
purchase lands, and hold them. . . . 4. To have a common seal. . . . 5. To make by-
laws or private statutes for the better government of the corporation .... Id. at 476.
[Vol. 63
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mention of limited liability when describing the characteristics
of corporations.12 It seems that Professor Williston was accurate
when he stated:
[Tihough it may be hazardous to assert that at common law
the rule was [that] if the corporation became insolvent the
persons constituting it were obliged to contribute their pri-
vate fortunes . . ., it is certain that, so far as the evidence
goes, it points to that conclusion.'3
The 1691 case of Dr. Salmon v. Hamborough Company'4
supports the contention that early English corporate law af-
forded owners no limited liability. There the court held that if
a corporation was unable to pay its debts, a corporate creditor
could force the corporation to levy an assessment against its
members in order to obtain the necessary funds to pay the
debt.'"
Even as late as the early 19th century it is unclear whether
an owner of corporate shares enjoyed limited liability. After an
examination of the law of the period, the Handlins concluded
that the results "strike at the very roots of the common as-
sumption that limited liability was always an essential attrib-
ute of corporateness . . ., without specific statement in the
charter."'" Further, some legislatures had enacted laws explic-
itly making the shareholder of certain types of corporations
liable for the debts of the company. 7 By 1888, however, Profes-
12 Handlin & Handlin, supra note 7, at 11 list others who omitted mention of
limited liability as a characteristic of incorporation. See also Eaton, The First Book
in English on the Law of Incorporation, 12 YALE L.J. 259, 281 (1903).
, Williston, supra note 8, at 160.
" 22 Eng. Rep. 763 (Ch. 1671).
, Id. But see E. DODD, AMERICAN BUSINESS CORPORATIONS UNTIL 1860 369 (1954)
where he concludes that the holding of the Dr. Salmon case was not determinative of
any indirect liability of shareholders for the debts of the corporation. The latter would
result only if "corporations had broad power to make assessments and to enforce
payment by action and not merely by forfeiture of a delinquent's shares. The question
... was never judicially answered ..... Id. at 369.
'1 Handlin & Handlin, supra note 7, at 10. See also Livermore, Unlimited Liability
in Early American Corporations, 43 J. POL. ECON. 674 (1935).
,1 See Dodd, The Evolution of Limited Liability in American Industry:
Massachusetts, 61 HAv. L. Rav. 1351 (1948); Livermore, supra note 16. Both writers
discuss the statutorily imposed unlimited liability on the shareholders of manufactur-
ing corporations during the first half of the 19th century.
The Handlins used the passage of these types of acts as rebuttal to those who
believed that limited liability was usual. The Handlins noted that the passage of the
1975]
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sor Williston could assuredly assert that "it has been settled for
a long time that individual members are not liable for the debts
of a corporation 1.... -8
Although it is difficult to determine all the reasons for the
shift to limited liability, the encouragement and retention of
business enterprises by the states seem to have been the most
pervasive factors. In Massachusetts, for example, which in 1809
had adopted unlimited liability for shareholders of manufac-
turing corporations, 9 the argument most consistently raised by
the advocates of limited liability was based on the need to
retain investment capital in the state.2 1 It was argued that in
order to make Massachusetts competitive with other states for
the manufacturing companies and the benefits which accom-
pany them, it must grant limited liability. Otherwise, the argu-
ment continued, the flight of capital to other states that did
grant limited liability would be detrimental to the economy of
the state.
Another argument raised in favor of limited liability was
that it would be unfair to hold one shareholder liable for the
debts of the entire corporation. This argument was stated in
1829 by a writer in American Jurist:
A person purchasing a single share of one hundred dollars in
a corporation may be compelled to pay debts of the corpora-
tion to the amount of a hundred thousand, the whole business
of the concern being managed without any interference with,
or even knowledge of it on his part .... He may thus be made
liable to an indefinite extent for the acts of others over whom
he has no control. His risk is altogether disproportionate to
his chance of profit.2'
Finally, a Kentucky case decided in 1893 further illus-
Law of March 3, 1809 (Mass. Stat. 1808, ch. 65, sect. 6), which gave unlimited liability
for the shareholders of manufacturing corporations, was not met by "one word of the
debate that would inevitably have followed a radical change." This, they contended,
lent support to their thesis that in the absence of any charter provision, unlimited
liability was normal. Handlin & Handlin, supra note 7, at 16.
,2 Williston, supra note 8, at 162.
" Stat. 1808, ch. 65, sect. 6 (1809).
See DODD, supra note 15, at 1366-79. Dodd questioned whether limited liability
had any impact on the location of manufacturing. He pointed out that other factors
(e.g., abundant water) may have attracted capital to New Hampshire.
21 2 AM. JURIST 92, 101 (1829).
[Vol. 63
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trates some of the considerations behind the transition to lim-
ited liability. In explaining the reason the Kentucky legislature
had permitted two or more persons to form a corporation the
Court stated:
[tihe purpose of the statute was to enable two or more per-
sons possessed of a capital or skill to associate themselves in
business, and to limit their liability as against the improvi-
dent acts of each other, or the act of the corporation ....
It invites the investment of the capital stock of one to be
placed in the same business with the skill of another, or a
combination of capital that encourages trade, the burden of
which mere individual enterprise would be unwilling to as-
sume .... 22
III. LIABILITY OF SHAREHOLDERS BASED ON AGENCY PRINCIPLES
But in most of the cases the language about agency is merely
a by-product of new law in the making - harmless until
someone begins to take it seriously.?
Cases sometimes refer loosely to a corporation as being an
agent for its shareholders.24 Clearly, if a corporation is in an
actual agency relationship with its shareholders, the sharehold-
ers would incur personal liability under all contracts executed
on their behalf by the corporation. The existence of a true
principal-agent relationship, however, is often difficult to
show. Most often the court merely intones the magical word
"agency" without analyzing the actual relationship.
It would be more logically consistent, and more legally
correct, if the courts would apply the same reasoning and prin-
ciples of agency law to corporate-shareholder relationships as
it applies to other principal-agent situations. In order for the
corporation to bind a shareholder as its "principal", there must
be found some "authority" for it to do so. This authority can
be either "real" or "apparent," but it must, nevertheless, exist.
" Louisville Banking Co. v. Eisenman, 21 S.W. 531, 532 (Ky. 1893).
E. LArrN, SUBSIDIARIES AND AFFILIATE CORPORATIONS 165 (1936).
24 E.g., Wade & Wade v. Central Broadcasting Co., 288 N.W. 441, 443 (Iowa
1939); Platt v. Brander Co., 230 P. 633, 635 (Wash. 1924). See also P. POWELL, PARENT
AND SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS § 21 (1931) ("In many cases, doubtlessly, the term
'agent' is used merely as equivalent to 'instrumentality' in the statement of the Instru-
mentality Rule." Id.).
1975]
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If the agency relationship is to be based upon "real author-
ity", the principal (in this instance the shareholder) must man-
ifest "to another person, called an agent, his willingness that
the agent act on his behalf in some specified way in some
specific transaction." 5 This manifestation might either be in
words, or by the principal's conduct. If the former, the real
authority is "express"; if the latter, it is "implied".
Express authority arises when "the principal in express
and explicit language [makes] . . . clear to the agent his will-
ingness or desire that the act in question be done."2 Contrasted
with this is implied authority that arises without explicit au-
thorizing language. 2 But nonetheless the authority is given,
either by failing to withhold the authority in a broad grant (in
which "the agent is said to have implied authority to do acts
consistent with the direction")28 or by conduct by the principal
that expresses to the agent the principal's desire for the agent
to act.29 In addition to express and implied authority, the power
of an agent to bind his principal can be based on "apparent
authority".3 1 Contrary to real authority, where the manifesta-
tions by the principal to the agent are all-important, apparent
authority is based on manifestations made by the principal to
a third party. Accordingly, if the principal's language in a
course of conduct leads a third party to reasonably believe that
the agent has authority to bind the principal, that agent has
apparent authority. This is true notwithstanding that the
agent has no real authority.
While many cases hold that a shareholder is liable for the
debts of his corporation if the corporation is his agent, an anal-
ysis of the cases according to agency principles indicates that
2 F. MECHEM, OUTLINES OF THE LAW OF AGENCY § 35 (4th ed. 1952).
21 Id. at § 40.
27 See F. MECHEM, supra note 25, at §§ 51-54; W. SEAVEY, STUDIES IN AGENCY 81
(1949).
2 W. SEAVEY, supra note 27, at § 8.
29 F. MECHEM, supra note 25, at § 54.
11 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 8 (1959). The theoretical basis for the
apparent authority notion has been the source of debate for commentators. Some see
it as an estoppel concept, while others view the concept as based on contract. W.
SEAVEY, supra note 27, at 81-82. Mechem, however, thinks that the debate over the
theory is "unfortunate", as it is "scarcely more than a difference in terminology." F.
MECHEM, supra note 25, at § 90.
11 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 8, comment a (1959).
[Vol. 63
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often no true agency relationship exists. Rather, the courts are,
in actuality, finding liability based upon a related theory, the
"instrumentality theory."3 As one authority has stated: "In
many cases, doubtless, the term 'agent' is used merely as
equivalent to 'instrumentality' in the statement of the Instru-
mentality Rule. '33
In other instances, however, courts have utilized tradi-
tional principal-agent concepts to hold the owners liable on
corporate obligations. Although the courts are often unclear in
their analyses, the cases typically involve an allegation that the
corporation had real authority, usually implied, to act as agent
for the owners.
One such case is Morgan v. Jackson Ready-Mix Concrete,34
in which the plaintiff, in order to secure payment for concrete
sand delivery to Hyde Construction Company, brought suit
against its owners, Morgan and Hyde. The plaintiff alleged
that the Hyde Construction Company was the agent of Morgan
and Hyde, who, incidentally, were also partners in a general
contracting firm. After stating the rule that a corporation may
act as an agent for a natural person or for another corporation,
the court upheld a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff. The
court determined that the corporation was an agent for the
partners, apparently because Morgan and Hyde owned and
completely dominated Hyde Construction Company, and uti-
lized it to carry on their business as general contractors. The
court emphasized that the partnership agreement between
Morgan and Hyde contained a provision stating that "all bids
for work shall be made in the name of R.W. Hyde, Jr., doing
")35business as Hyde Construction Company....
In Darling Stores Corporation v. Young Realty Co.3" an
E.g., Ohio Edison Coal v. Warner Coal Corp., 72 N.E.2d 487 (Ohio 1945);
Tennessee Consol. Coal Co. v. Home Ice & Coal Co., 156 S.W.2d 454 (Tenn. 1941).
For a discussion of the instrumentality theory, see the discussion infra at § IV.
3 P. POWELL, PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS § 21 (1931). See also New York
Trust Co. v. Carpenter, 250 F. 668, 673 (6th Cir. 1918) where the court recognized that
the district court had used "'agency' as a synonym of 'adjunct,' whatever that may
mean and as descriptive of a relation variously defined in the case as 'adjunct,'
'branch,' 'instrumentality.'" Id. at 673.
' 157 So. 2d 772 (Miss. 1963).
Id. at 774.
121 F.2d 112 (8th Cir. 1941). Although this case was apparently decided on
agency principles, the court's analysis often was confused as to the actual theory
1975]
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agent-principal relationship again was found to exist between
a corporation and its owner. In that case, Darling Shops, Inc.
(Shops), a subsidiary of Darling Stores Corporation (Stores),
became assignee of a lease of property, which was owned by
Young Realty Company. Shops, which apparently had no
assets or income of any kind, was "created and existed solely
for the purpose of leasing store locations throughout the United
States which they in turn subleased to the [parent, Stores]. ' '37
The property leased from Young was utilized by the parent for
its operation of a retail store. When the lease was abandoned,
Young sued Stores, the parent of the contracting party. In the
course of holding the parent liable on the lease, the court found
that an agency relationship did exist, saying "as we have
shown, however, the agency here did in fact exist, merely carry-
ing forward the relationship with an undisclosed principal." 38
The imprecise analyses in the foregoing cases are typical
in this area. One problem caused by this is uncertainty as to
the type of authority possessed by the corporation. Although
the issue usually centers on whether the corporation has real
authority to bind the owners to a third party, this rather funda-
mental part of the analysis is often omitted. Perhaps because
of this, the courts refer only vaguely, if at all, to which actions
of the owners have established the principal-agent relation-
ship.
To establish real authority under agency concepts, the
principal must use words or engage in conduct that "causes the
agent to believe that the principal desires him so to act on the
principal's account."3 This requirement causes some obvious
conceptual problems. Primarily the question arises of how a
utilized. At one point the court used the term "alter ego" (Id. at 115); at another point
the court stated it would "ignore the fiction of corporate legal entity when the circum-
stances justify it . . . ." Id. at 116. In the end, however, it appears the case was
decided on agency principles, as the court stated that "the agency here did in fact exist
.Id. at 117.
" Id. at 113.
Id. at 117. Examples of the cases which have discussed agency as a basis for
liability between the related business entities include Pacific Can Co. v. Hewes, 95
F.2d 42 (9th Cir. 1938); National Plumbing Supply Co. v. Torretti, 175 S.W.2d 947
(Mo. 1934); Whitehurst v. FCX Fruit & Vegetable Serv., Inc., 32 S.E.2d 34 (N.C.
1944).
11 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 26 (1957) [emphasis added]; W. Seavey,
supra note 27, at § 18.
[Vol. 63
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shareholder, who may be in complete control of a corporation,
manifests to the corporation a desire that the corporation act
on his behalf."
If a shareholder of a corporation goes to the president of
the corporation and instructs the corporation to represent him
in a certain matter, quite clearly there is express authority for
the corporation to act on the shareholder's behalf. The more
typical cases, however, exemplified by Morgan and Darling
Stores, involve less explicit authorization. But even in these
cases there existed factual circumstances that could support a
contention that the corporations had real authority to act for
the owners. The key factors in those cases seem to be the com-
plete dominance of the agent-corporation by the owner and the
fact that the contracts were in furtherance of the business pur-
pose of the owners. Since the establishment of real authority
requires the principal to manifest to the agent the principal's
"willingness that the agent act on his behalf in some specified
way in some specified transaction,"'" it is reasonable to pre-
sume such a manifestation from the facts that the owners com-
pletely dominate the corporation and that the contracted-for
benefits further the separate business purpose of the owners.
An unquestioning acceptance of this notion, however, may
lead to substantial damage to the concept of limited liability.
For example, how does one distinguish the Darling case and the
Morgan case from any situation in which one person or a group
of persons dominate a corporation. If, as the above cases seem
to indicate, authority to bind the principal can spring from
control plus receipt of the benefits of the transaction, could not
one say that a corporation is always the agent for one in a
controlling position with respect to that corporation?
In his work, Parent and Subsidiary Corporations, Professor
Powell perceived the same problem.42 After posing a hypotheti-
cal situation strikingly similar to the Darling and Morgan
cases, Powell stated that:
,1 As Professor Seavey has stated: "If Corporation A by written contract expressly
makes Corporation B its Agent, the former is liable for the latter's obligations (incurred
within the scope of the agency) on the ordinary principles of the law of Agency." W.
SFAVEy, supra note 27, at § 10. See also, E. LATTY, supra note 23, at § 43.
4' F. MECHEM, supra note 25, at § 35.
, POWELL, supra note 33, at §§ 21 & 22.
1975]
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on ordinary principles of agency [the parent corporation]
would be [liable]. As a practical matter we must admit that
the parent corporation completely dominates the subsidiary,
and that from a practical standpoint, the subsidiary's busi-
ness is run in the interest of the parent corporation."
Powell's solution in this situation is simple: He rejects agency
concepts, stating that they are inappropriate for holding the
shareholders liable, unless there exists express authority in the
corporation to act on behalf of its owners. He fears that "a
sincere application of agency rules would largely destroy the
protection afforded stockholders by incorporation.""
In Kentucky, there are only a handful of cases in which the
court discusses the impact of agency concepts on the limited
liability of corporate owners. Furthermore, the value of these
cases is minimal, because they either contain a confused dis-
cussion of the issue,45 involve an issue significantly different
from the issue herein under discussion,46 or apply the law of
another jurisdiction.47 Accordingly, it is impossible to predict
how Kentucky courts would treat a claim that a corporation
was an agent for its owners. The Kentucky cases do seem to
recognize that a principal-agent relationship can exist between
the corporate owner and the corporation," but it is not clear
what a plaintiff would have to show to establish that the corpo-
ration had the necessary authority to contractually bind the
owners to third parties. Nevertheless, if an owner of a corpora-
tion completely dominates the corporation and if the corpora-
:3 Id. at § 22.
1 Id.
,5 Richmond & Irvine Constr. Co. v. Richmond, Nicholasville, Irvine & Beattyville
R.R., 68 F. 105 (6th Cir. 1895); Harlan Pub. Serv. Co. v. Eastern Constr. Co., 71
S.W.2d 24 (Ky. 1934).
4 Ayer & Lord Tie Co. v. Commonwealth, 82 S.W. 177 (Ky. 1925).
'" In re Kentucky Wagon Mfg. Co., 3 F. Supp. 958 (W.D. Ky. 1932). This case
contains a lengthy discussion of how the elements of a principal-agent relationship
between related corporations affect the liability of the controlling corporation. The
case, however, involved the question of 'whether a claim of a controlling corporation
against a bankrupt subsidiary corporation should be subordinated to other claimants.
Where the issue is one of subordination in bankruptcy, the courts do not apply state
law. See 3A W. COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 63.03 n.29 and 63.08 n.1 (14th ed. 1972).
Therefore, that case does not necessarily involve a discussion of Kentucky law.
11 Richmond & Irvine Constr. Co. v. Richmond, Nicholasville, Irvine & Beattyville
R.R., 68 F. 105 (6th Cir. 1895); Harlan Pub. Serv. Co. v. Eastern Constr. Co., 71
S.W.2d 24 (Ky. 1934).
[Vol. 63
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tion is utilized by the owner in the running of a personal busi-
ness, there is significant risk that the corporation will be de-
clared the agent of the owner. This risk would be present
whether the owner were an individual or a corporation."
IV. DISREGARD OF THE CORPORATE ENTITY
A. Traditional Theories
In addition to the agency theory, plaintiffs have utilized
several other approaches in an effort to hold the owners of a
corporation liable for corporate obligations. One such ap-
proach, the instrumentality theory, was expounded by Profes-
sor Powell nearly forty years ago.5" Powell suggested that the
disregard of the corporate entity required the establishment of
three elements: (1) the corporation was a mere instrumentality
of the shareholder; (2) the shareholder exercised control over
the corporation in such a way as to defraud or harm the plain-
tiff; (3) refusal to disregard the corporate entity would subject
the plaintiff to unjust loss.5 '
Powell's formulation has been relied on in a number of
cases. 5  Furthermore, the courts that have adopted Powell's
test have been somewhat rigid in requiring that all elements be
present.53 Accordingly, in Lowendahl v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 54
a case decided under the instrumentality theory, the court re-
fused to pierce the corporate veil and hold the parent corpora-
tion liable. This was apparently because the parent had not
11 But see Hamilton, The Corporate Entity, 49 Tax. L. Rav. 979 (1971) ("courts
are probably more willing to 'pierce the corporate veil' when the defendant is a corpora-
tion rather than an individual.")
P. POWELL, PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS (1931).
, Id. at 4-6. One court stated the requirements of the instrumentality theory as
follows: "there must be complete domination as to the transaction in question, fraud
or injustice must result from the use of such control, and the plaintiff's injury must
be the proximate result of the control and breach of duty of the dominating corpora-
tion." National Bond Fin. Co. v. General Motors Corp., 238 F. Supp. 248, 255 (W.D.
Mo. 1964).
52 E.g., Fish v. East, 114 F.2d 177 (10th Cir. 1940); Brown v. Margrande Compania
Naviera, 281 F. Supp. 1004 (E.D. Va. 1968).
" In some cases utilizing the instrumentality theory, the basis for the refusal to
disregard the corporate entity is less than clear. E.g., National Bond Fin. Co. v.
General Motors Corp., 238 F. Supp. 248 (W.D. Mo. 1964).
5, 287 N.Y.S. 62 (App. Div. 1936), affd, 6 N.E.2d 56 (1936), rehearing denied, 7
N.E.2d 704 (1937).
1975]
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exercised the degree of control required under the instrumen-
tality theory. The court found, instead, that control of the sub-
sidiary corporation had been in the hands of one Walter Van
Bokkelen, who had been a substantial stockholder and presi-
dent of the subsidiary. In the course of the opinion the court
defined the extent of dominance necessary to hold a share-
holder liable under the instrumentality theory:
Control through mere ownership of a majority or of even all
the capital stock and the use of the power incident thereto to
elect officers and directors will not in and of itself predict
liability. [Citation omitted.] Liability must depend upon a
domination and control so complete that the corporation may
be said to have no will, mind or existence of its own, and to
be operated as a mere department of the business of the
stockholder."
In addition to the requirement of control, disregarding the
corporate entity under the instrumentality theory requires an
element of unfairness." An illustration of this is Brown v. Mar-
grande Companie Naviera, S.A.5" In that case the plaintiff had
rendered salvage service to a tanker that was owned by Texas
Panama Company (Panama). The tanker was carrying cargo
owned by Texas Export Company (Export). Texaco, Incorpo-
rated (Texaco) owned stock in both companies and placed
some of its directors on the boards of each company. Although
there was little evidence of domination beyond the above
facts, 8 the court made clear that even if there had been domi-
nation, Texaco would not have been liable for the salvage serv-
ice. In explaining this conclusion, the court stated that
"Is]omething more [than control] is needed, such as fraud,
illegality, or wrongdoing which produced the injury or com-
plaint, otherwise the corporate entity will stand." Then, having
11 Id. at 72-73.
5 See, e.g., State v. Swift & Co., 187 S.W.2d 127 (Tex. 1945); Beale v. Kappa
Alpha Order, 64 S.E.2d 789 (Va. 1951).
7 281 F. Supp. 1004 (E.D. Va. 1968).
' The court stated in the course of the opinion that, except for the ownership of
stock and the interlocking directorates, "[t]here is nothing to establish that Texaco
exercised dominion or control over Export or Panama, or directed their policies, or
maintained their records, finances, properties or rights, or directed either of their
operations." Id. at 1005.
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found "no evidence . . of injustice or fraud or wrong. .,,51
it held for the defendant.
G.E.J. Corp. v. Uranium Aire, Inc.," exemplifies yet an-
other rubric under which the corporate entity is disregarded
-the "alter-ego" theory.' Therein, Uranium Aire, Inc. (Ura-
nium) had granted an option to G.E.J. Corporation (GEJ) to
purchase certain property owned by Uranium. GEJ agreed
that during the term of the option it would mine a certain
amount of uranium ore or, in the alternative, pay Uranium
$75,000. Prior to the termination date GEJ repudiated the op-
tion, and, as a result, Uranium sued both GEJ and its parent,
M.F. Corporation (MF). In holding MF liable on the option
agreement, the court explicated the alter-ego doctrine as ap-
plied in California:
California law established two requirements for an alter-ego
relationship: first, that the subsidiary is not only influenced
and governed by the parent, but that there is such unity of
interest and ownership that their individuality or separate-
ness has ceased; second, that the facts are such that an ad-
herence to normal attributes or separate corporate existence
would sanction a fraud or promote injustice.62
The first element, the "unity of interest and ownership", was
apparently fulfilled because "GEJ conducted no independent
business but was owned, controlled, and operated as a conduit
for JMF's] . . . purchase of the property."63 GEJ was under
complete control of MF, and MF had paid for the option, the
cost of exploring the property and other expenses of GEJ. The
requirement that injustice result from recognizing the corpo-
rate existence was met because GEJ was undercapitalized and
' Id. at 1006-07.
311 F.2d 749 (9th Cir. 1963).
" For a discussion of the alter-ego doctrine, see N. LATrN, THE LAW OF COR-
PORA TONS 86-87 (2d ed. 1971). The instrumentality theory and the alter-ego theory
are often used interchangeably. See, e.g., Fisser v. International Bank, 282 F.2d 231
(2d Cir. 1960), a case in which the court used the Powell formulation as appropriate
to determine when the corporate entity should be disregarded, but the court refused
to find the owners liable because the plaintiffs had "failed to prove that Allied was
the respondent's alter-ego." Id. at 241.
62 Id. at 756.
"Id.
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MF had made assurances that it would stand behind GEJ's
obligations .6
B. A More Realistic Formulation
Although other commentators have advanced different
theories under which the corporate entity may be disregarded, 5
Professor Latty has formulated the most realistic standard; one
which is, in fact, often utilized by the courts. Latty remarked
that "[w]hat the formula comes down to, once shorn of ver-
biage about control, instrumentality, agency and corporate
entity, is that the liability is imposed to reach an equitable
result."" Research confirms Latty's observation.
Stated more precisely, the courts, in determining whether
to disregard the corporate entity, examine all the factors of the
particular case and make a determination, in light of those
factors, whether it is necessary to disregard the corporate exist-
ence in order "to reach an equitable result."67 This same analy-
sis occurs whether the theory professedly applied is called the
instrumentality theory, the alter-ego theory, or some other
theory."5 The factors emphasized by the courts in determining
11 Id. at 755. Other California cases have discussed factors that show unfairness.
Thus, for example, in Automotriz Del Golfo De California v. Resnick, 306 P.2d 1 (Cal.
1957) the court emphasized undercapitalization and failure to issue stock. For other
California cases emphasizing the non-issuance of stock as a relevant factor in deter-
mining whether the alter-ego doctrine should be applicable, see Geisenhoff v. Mabrey,
137 P.2d 36 (Cal. 1943); Marr v. Postal Union Life Ins. Co., 105 P.2d 649 (Cal. 1940).
11 See, e.g., Annot., 38 A.L.R.3d 1103 (1971); Comment, Alternative Methods of
Piercing the Corporate Veil in Contract and Tort Cases, 48 BOSTON U.L. REv. 123
(1968).
11 E. LATTY, SUBSIDIARIES AND AFFILIATED CORPORATIONS 191 (1936). A similar test
for disregard of the corporate entity was proposed by Mr. Justice Cardozo in Berkey
v. Third Ave. Ry., 155 N.E. 58, 61 (N.Y. 1926) where he stated: "Dominion may be so
complete, interference so obtrusive, that by the general rules of agency the parent will
be a principal and the subsidiary an agent. Where control is less than this, we are
remitted to the tests of honesty and justice." See also Fuller, The Incorporated Individ-
ual: A Study of the One-Man Company, 51 HARv. L. REV. 1373, 1402 (1938).
11 In an excellent article by Professor Hamilton, he makes the observations that,
after courts have looked at various factors in determining whether to respect the
corporate entity, "the conclusion that the shareholder is liable may be buttressed by
the meaningless statement that such acts make the corporation the shareholder's 'alter
ego' or 'instrumentality.'" Hamilton, The Corporate Entity, 49 TEx. L. REv. 979, 990
(1971).
An example of a case in which this was recognized was Zaist v. Olsen, 227 A.2d
552 (Conn. 1967). Although clearly utilizing the "instrumentality" theory to find the
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whether to disregard the corporate entity are not a function of
the theory used. Rather, certain facts seem to reappear in all
cases, notwithstanding that different tests are being applied. 9
It is impossible to say that the presence of any factor or
any combination of factors will result in a disregard of the
corporate entity. Nevertheless, a combination of some or all of
the following factors is usually present in cases where the cor-
porate entity is disregarded.
1. Control
Although it is clear that mere stock ownership will not
result in the owner of a corporation being held liable for its
obligations,7" some element of control seems indispensable to
the disregard of the corporate entity.7' An example of the im-
portance of the element of control can be seen in Fisser v.
International Bank,72 a case in which the plaintiff was attempt-
ing to hold the owner (parent corporation) liable under the
terms of a contract entered into with the subsidiary. Although
the subsidiary's officers were all high-ranking officials in the
parent company and although the parent was either the domi-
nant or sole shareholder in the company, the court refused to
disregard the corporate entity, because the plaintiff "failed to
prove [the necessary degree of] .. .control . . . ." The court
found that the parent's action did not constitute the type of
owners of the corporation liable, the court stated that limited liability "will be disre-
garded where, as here, the interests of justice and righteous dealing so demands ......
Id. at 557.
1 Compare G.E.J. Corp. v. Uranium Aire, Inc., 311 F.2d 749 (9th Cir. 1962) (a
case using the "alter-ego" doctrine and emphasizing as a basis for the decision control,
undercapitalization and representations of parent that it would back up the subsidi-
ary), with Gledhill v. Fisher & Co., 262 N.W. 371 (a case using Powell's instrumentality
theory, but also emphasizing control and undercapitalization).
11 See, e.g., Chichester v. Polikowsky, 231 F.2d 183 (9th Cir. 1955); Sirmons v.
Arnold Lumber Co., 167 So. 2d 588 (Fla. Ct. App. 1964); Kroger Co. v. J. Weingarten,
Inc., 380 S.W.2d 145 (Tex. 1964).
11 See, e.g., G.E.J. Corp. v. Uranium Aire, Inc., 311 F.2d 749 (9th Cir. 1963), a
case in which the court upheld a lower court's disregard of the corporate entity only
after finding that the parent "retained actual control of GEJ and made all important
decisions with respect to the transaction." Id. at 756. One commentator stated that
"some degree of dominance is found in all the cases where plaintiffs seek successfully
or unsuccessfully to hold liable a shareholder or affiliate." Comment, Disregarding the
Corporate Entity: Contract Claims, 28 OHIo ST. L.J. 441, 448 (1967).
72 282 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1960).
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direct, "meddling with management" necessary to pierce the
corporate veil. Rather, the court stated, "it is equally plausible
to ascribe the acts to the . . . [officers of the subsidiary] as
. . . executives participating in a manner normally usual for
stockholders and directors of an independent corporation." In
addition, the court found the control of the parent diminished
because of the presence of outsiders on the board of directors
of the subsidiary.73
The cases indicate that the more pervasive the control
exercised over the corporation by the owners, the more likely
the courts are to disregard the corporate entity.74 This is re-
flected in the fact that cases in which courts have disregarded
the corporate entity generally involve an owner's intrusion into
the day-to-day affairs of the corporation. An example of this
can be found in Consolidated Rock Co. v. Du Bois. 5 That case
involved a reorganization under the Bankruptcy Act of Consoli-
dated and its two wholly-owned subsidiaries (Union and Con-
sumers). The Supreme Court held that the creditors of Union
and Consumers were entitled to look to the assets of Consoli-
dated for payment. Although there were other factors involved,
the Court was admittedly influenced by the degree of intrusion
by Consolidated into the affairs of Union and Consumers. Jus-
tice Douglas, writing for the majority, stated that "it is well
settled that where a holding company directly intervenes in the
management of its subsidiaries, it is responsible for the obliga-
tions of those subsidiaries incurred or arising during its man-
agement.""6 In Consolidated this direct intervention by the
parent was readily apparent because an "operating agree-
ment", which turned over to the parent the "entire manage-
ment, operation and financing" of the subsidiaries, had been
executed between the parent and the subsidiaries. This ele-
,1 Id. at 238.
7 The language of numerous cases indicates that pervasive control is a prerequis-
ite for disregard of the corporate entity. See e.g., G.E.J. Corp. v. Uranium Aire, Inc.,
311 F.2d 749 (9th Cir. 1963) (requiring that "the subsidiary is not only influenced and
governed by the parent, but that there is such unity of interest and ownership that
their individuality or separateness has ceased . . . . "); Zaist v. Olson, 227 A.2d 552
(Conn. 1967) ("There must be 'such domination of finances, policies and practices that
the controlled corporation has, so to speak, no separate mind, will or existence of its
own and is but a business conduit for its principal.'" Id. at 557 (citation omitted).
312 U.S. 510 (1941).
,' Id. at 524.
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ment of pervasive control is demonstrated by other cases in
which the corporate entity has been disregarded.77
Finally, it is apparent that control alone will generally not
support a disregard of the corporate entity. As will be recalled,
the more traditional formulation of Professor Powell requires
that, in addition to control, there must be a finding that the
"control. . . was exercised. . . in such a manner as to defraud
or wrong the complainant" '78 and that a refusal to disregard the
corporate entity "would result in an unjust loss or injury to the
complainant."79 In addition to Powell's statements, numerous
cases indicate that other factors must be present in order to
impose liability upon the owners. Some cases have specifically
refused to find liability because only control was shown.'" Other
cases have assessed liability against the owners of corporations,
but only after finding that other factors beyond mere control
were present.,'
2. Undercapitalization
Corporate undercapitalization is often a factor in a court's
decision to disregard the corporate entity.82 While it has been
stated that undercapitalization alone will not support a disre-
garding of the corporate entity, it is generally present in cases
holding the owners liable for corporate obligations. 84 As one
7 See, e.g., Consolidated Sun Ray, Inc. v. Oppenstein, 335 F.2d 801 (8th Cir.
1964); Zaist v. Olsen, 227 A.2d 552 (Conn. 1967).
"R POWELL, supra note 33, at 5.
'" POWELL, supra note 33, at 6.
11 See, e.g., Sirmons v. Arnold Lumber Co., 167 So. 2d 588 (Fla. Ct. App. 1964)
("The corporate veil will not be pierced when it is not shown that the corporation was
used to mislead creditors or for fraudulent purposes; without more, the mere fact that
one or more individuals control the corporate activity is not sufficient to justify imposi-
tion of the corporate debt upon the shareholders . . . ." Id. at 589-90.)
" See, e.g., Rounds & Porter Lumber Co. v. Burns, 225 S.W.2d 1 (Ark. 1949).
x' See Comment, 28 OHIO ST. L.J. 441, 460 (1967) ("it is more or less present in
all cases"). This discussion should be distinguished from the requirement in some
states that a corporation have a minimum paid-in capital before it begins business.
See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-14.6 (1962) (prohibiting a company from transacting
any business or incurring any indebtedness until it received one thousand dollars for
stock, five hundred of which must be in cash.) The recent revision of the corporation
law of Kentucky eliminated a similar provision. See Note, Organizing the Corporation
Under the New Business Corporation Act - A Comparison with Prior Law, 61 Ky. L.J.
95, 106 (1972).
Fisser v. International Bank, 282 F.2d 231, 240 (2d Cir. 1960).
'" E.g., Shafford v. Otto Sales Co., 308 P.2d 428 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957).
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court stated, "the proper rule is that inadequate financing,
where such appears, is a factor, an important factor, in deter-
mining whether to remove the insulation to stockholders
.... ,,81 This means that if a corporation transacts business
with assets that are deemed to be inadequate, it increases the
probability that the limited liability of its owners will not be
respected. 6
One obvious problem is the need to define the standard of
inadequacy. s7 Professor Lattin has perhaps accurately de-
scribed "adequate capitalization" as the amount a "reasonably
prudent man with a general knowledge of the particular type
of business and its hazards would determine was reasonable
. . . in light of any special circumstances which existed at the
time of incorporation .... "8 Beyond this general statement,
however, it is hard to qualify the concept of undercapital-
ization. One court found undercapitalization where the owners
had contributed $5,000 and had a business volume of $100,000
to $150,000 per month.89 In another case, the court found un-
dercapitalization of a subsidiary that had capital consisting of
only a $1,000 demand note (of which only $300 had been paid).
The subsidiary had entered into a contract with potential lia-
bility of $75,000.0
Carlesimo v. Schwebel, 197 P.2d 167, 174 (Cal. Ct. App. 1948).
Although seldom articulated, the requirement of adequate capitalization means
that the net assets of the corporation must be adequate. Net assets are defined in the
Model Act as "the amount by which the total assets of a corporation exceed the total
debts of the corporation." MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION AC § 2(j) (1969). This would
be represented by the equity accounts. See, e.g., Hichle v. Torrance Millworks, Inc.,
272 P.2d 780 (Cal. Ct. App. 1954) (finding undercapitalization because "[tihe corpo-
ration started out owing money equal to the value of the assets. Its net worth was nil."
Id. at 783).
For suggestions as to what constitutes undercapitalization see Symposium -
The Close Corporation, 52 Nw. U.L. REv. 345, 369-70 (1957).
1 N. LATTIN, supra note 61, at 77-78. Ballantine stated that "shareholders should
in good faith put at the risk of the business unencumbered capital reasonably adequate
for its prospective liabilities. If the capital is illusory or trifling compared with the
business to be done and the risks of loss, this is a ground for denying the separate entity
privilege." H. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS 303 (Rev. ed. 1946). It has been suggested
that that test of adequacy of capitalization may differ depending on the issue involved.
Comment, 28 OHIO ST. L.J. 441, 459 (1967).
" Automotriz Del Golfo De California v. Resnick, 306 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1957).
90 G.E.J. Corp. v. Uranium Aire, Inc., 311 F.2d 749 (9th Cir. 1962). In another case
a corporation was deemed undercapitalized where the corporation had been started
with only $7,700 while doing nearly two million dollars in business a year. Remme v.
Herzog, 35 Cal. Rptr. 586 (Cal. Ct. App. 1963).
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In determining the adequacy of capitalization, courts have
sometimes relied on a corporation's pre-incorporation existence
(assuming, of course, that there was one) as a norm for post-
incorporation adequacy of capital.' Applying this rule, a Cali-
fornia court, in affirming a lower court decision that had held
the owners of a corporation liable on the corporate debt, em-
phasized that "just before the incorporation of the corporation,
the business had a net worth of $325,000. Notwithstanding this,
the corporation began business with an invested capital of only
$7,700. ' '12
One problem in undercapitalization cases that has trou-
bled both commentators and judges is the determination of the
point in time at which undercapitalization is measured. Lan-
guage from cases generally indicates that the critical time is
that of incorporation.13 Professor Hamilton has flatly stated
that "[i]nadequate capitalization is measured at the time of
formation of the corporation."" There are, however, some fairly
obvious exceptions to this rule. Most cases indicate that if an
adequately capitalized corporation subsequently becomes im-
pecunious, the corporation may be judged to be undercapital-
ized, especially if the cause of the insolvency is due to gross
mismanagement by the owners. Thus, if the corporation paid
dividends so large as to cripple the corporation and make it
insolvent 5 or if the corporation is prevented from making a
profit because it sells its products to the owners at a reduced
price, 6 it may be judged to be inadequately capitalized, not-
withstanding that it had sufficient capital at its inception.
Generally, however, if a corporation is adequately capitalized
at the outset, the erosion of its capital by the fortunes of busi-
ness will not expose the owners to personal liability.
1' N. LATMN, supra note 61, at 78.
,2 Remme v. Herzog, 35 Cal. Rptr. 586, 589 (Cal. Ct. App. 1963).
G.E.J. Corp. v. Uranium Aire, Inc., 311 F.2d 749 (9th Cir. 1962).
,' Hamilton, supra note 49, at 986.
' Burton v. Roos, 20 F. Supp. 75 (W.D. Tex. 1937), aff'd, 93 F.2d 380 (5th Cir.
1937).
,1 Rounds & Porter Lumber Co. v. Bums, 225 S.W.2d 1 (Ark. 1949).
,7 See generally Note, Liability of a Corporation for Acts of a Subsidiary or
Affiliate, 71 HAav. L. Rav. 1122, 1129 (1958).
" See the cases cited in Note, Liability of a Corporation for Acts of a Subsidiary
or Affiliate, 71 HAnv. L. Rav. 1122 n.52 (1958); see also cases cited in Hamilton, supra
note 49, at 936 n.25.
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3. Splitting the Economic Unit
Splitting a single economic enterprise into smaller corpo-
rate units is a practice that increases the risk a court will disre-
gard the corporate entity.9 Professor Berle used this "enter-
prise entity" theory to explain many of the cases in which a
parent corporation was held liable for the debts of a subsidi-
ary.'"" Berle's notion was that the assets available to satisfy
creditors of a corporation should be determined by economics,
not mere legal form. Thus, if a creditor has a claim against a
subsidiary, the assets of the parent should be available to sat-
isfy the claim, if the subsidiaries have "become, . . . as a busi-
ness matter, more or less indistinguishable parts of a larger
enterprise."'' 0 An example of this is where a lease or other
interest in property is taken by a subsidiary but is utilized by
the parent in the latter's business. In that situation, courts
have sometimes disregarded the corporate entity of the subsidi-
ary and held the parent corporation liable. 0
In Burton v. Roos"°3 the court looked to the splitting of the
economic unit as a factor in assessing liability against the own-
ers- of the corporation. There the plaintiff had recovered a judg-
ment against the Texas Company of Mexico (Mexico), and the
issue was whether that judgment should be enforceable against
the parent of Mexico. In holding the parent liable, the court
emphasized that "the sole purpose of the corporation of
[Mexico] . . . was to enable the Texas Corporation [the par-
ent ] I04 to produce oil and to do an oil business, etc., in Mexico
I" Hamilton, supra note 49, at 985. This has been raised, with varying degrees of
success, in tort cases where, for example, an individual will utilize multiple corpora-
tions, each owning a small amount of property. See, e.g., Black & White, Inc. v. Love,
367 S.W.2d 427 (Ark. 1963); Walkovszky v. Carlton, 223 N.E.2d 6, 276 N.Y.S.2d 585
(1966); Robinson v. Chase Maintenance Corp., 190 N.Y.S.2d 773 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
Berle, The Theory of Enterprise Entity, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 343 (1947).
,01 Id. at 348.
,°2 G.E.J. Corp. v. Uranium Aire, Inc., 311 F.2d 749 (9th Cir. 1962). The use by a
parent of an interest in land taken by a subsidiary will not always result in a disregard
of corporate entity. Rather, it is merely one factor. See, e.g., Gledhill v. Fisher & Co.,
262 N.W. 371 (Mich. 1935).
° 20 F. Supp. 75 (W.D. Tex. 1937), aff'd, 93 F.2d 380 (5th Cir. 1937).
,o Id. at 78. As with all cases in which the corporate entity is disregarded, more
than one factor was involved in the court's decision. The court in Burton also found
undercapitalization, pervasive control and the payment of large dividends that drained
the company's cash supply.
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.... " The parent was also in the oil business and simply had
split the economic entity.
Another example of a court refusing to respect the corpo-
rate entity of a component of a single economic unit is Zaist v.
Olson.'05 In that case Martin Olson had created and controlled
a number of companies that were utilized in his real estate
development enterprise. Plaintiff agreed to make some im-
provements on land owned by Olson personally. Although it
was unclear which of the Olson enterprises contracted with the
plaintiff, East Haven made the payments for the work. When
the plaintiff was unable to collect the last $28,000 on the con-
tract, he sued East Haven, Olson Inc. and Olson personally. In
holding that the plaintiff was not limited to the resources of
East Haven, the court stressed that East Haven was but one
part of a large enterprise, again showing the courts' tendency
to ignore the artificial splitting of an economic unit. The court
stated that East Haven "had no proprietary interest in the
property on which the work was done, and so far as appears, it
gained nothing from whatever part it played in the transac-
tion."'' 6 It went on to emphasize that East Haven "was used
by Olson for the benefit of Olson .... "I
4. Maintenance of Corporate Formalities
The failure to maintain the requisite corporate formalities
substantially increases the probability that the corporate exist-
ence will be disregarded.' 8 One such formality often discussed
by the courts is the maintenance of fiscal separateness between
the corporate owners and the corporation. For example, the
New York court, in refusing to hold a parent corporation liable
,0 227 A.2d 552 (Conn. 1967).
,I Id. at 555.
"' Id. at 557.
,oI See generally 2 G. HORNSTEIN, CORPORATION LAW AND PRAcTIcE § 751 (Supp.
1968). Conversely, the maintenance of corporate formalities is often heavily relied on
by courts in refusing to pierce the corporate veil. See, e.g., Fisser v. International Bank,
282 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1960), a case in which the court, in refusing to hold the owners
of a corporation liable, stated that it was "pointed to no authorities which justify a
disregard of a corporation's separate existence merely because of its undercapital-
ization when its controlling stockholder has at least regarded the formalities of such
existence." Id. at 240. See also Ohio Edison Co. v. Warner Coal Corp., 72 N.E.2d 487
(Ohio Ct. App. 1946).
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for the obligations of its subsidiary, emphasized that the sub-
sidiary made its own contracts, kept its own accounts, collected
its own revenues and paid its own operating expenses.' 9 An-
other court held that the plaintiff, suing on a lease entered into
with a corporation, had stated a cause of action against the
owners of the corporation where he alleged that
funds were shifted about . . . between the owners and the
corporation without regard to formality and to suit their
immediate convenience, that the deposit on the corporate
lease was paid by personal check of the shareholder without
any formal agreement for repayment and that the owners had
individually paid the taxes on the property."10
Other courts have interpreted the maintenance of separate
offices and the filing of separate reports to government agencies
as evidence of separate existence."' In California, the non-
issuance of stock is evidence of unity in the affairs of the corpo-
ration and its owners." '2 In addition to the foregoing, Professor
Hamilton has listed the following as creating a "substantial
risk that the separate corporate existence will be ignored": not
holding director and shareholder meetings, making decisions
by the owners as though they were partners, the absence of a
sharp distinction between corporate property and personal
property, and the absence of complete corporate and financial
records."3
Disregarding the corporate entity due to a lack of corporate
formalities has been soundly criticized by commentators. Pro-
fessor Fuller, writing in 1938, observed that "it is not at all
clear that a [sole shareholder's] previous failure to observe a
nice distinction between his dual capacities as individual and
,0' Stone v. Cleveland C.C. & St. L. Ry., 95 N.E. 816 (1911).
W, eisser v. Mursam Shoe Corp., 127 F.2d 344, 345 (2d Cir. 1942). See also
African Metals Corp. v. Bullowa, 41 N.E.2d 466 (1942), holding that plaintiff stated a
cause of action against the owners of a corporation where, inter alia, the day-to-day
financing of the corporation was handled out of shareholder funds.
" See, e.g., Eisenbarth v. Equity Mutual Ins. Co., 189 S.W.2d 168 (Mo. 1945).
But see Consolidated Sun Ray, Inc. v. Oppenstein, 335 F.2d 801 (8th Cir. 1964), where
the court pierced the corporate veil in spite of the fact that the subsidiary corporation
filed separate documents with appropriate government agencies.
112 Geisenhoff v. Mabrey, 137 P.2d 36 (Cal. Ct. App. 1943); Marr v. Postal Union
Life Ins. Co., 105 P.2d 649 (Cal. Ct. App. 1940).
"' Hamilton, supra note 49, at 990.
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corporate officer should bring upon his head the penalty of
personal liability.""' 4 Generally, the observation has been made
that "confusion and informality are not related to the claim
advanced by. . . contract plaintiffs" and that the disregard of
the corporate entity solely because of the presence of such cir-
cumstances therefore creates "a windfall" for the plaintiff, who
was in no way harmed by the confusion and informality.'"' It
has also been pointed out that a strict requirement of formality
may be troublesome for the smaller, closely held companies,
notoriously lax in following the corporate formalities."I6 If, how-
ever, the lack of distinction between the corporate and personal
affairs of the owner misled the contracting plaintiff into believ-
ing that he was dealing with the owners individually, commen-
tators and courts generally have agreed that owners should be
liable for the obligation."'
Notwithstanding this criticism, courts normally are more
inclined to disregard the corporate entity in those situations in
which the owners of the corporation have disregarded corporate
formalities."'
5. Estoppel
Estoppel is sometimes mentioned by courts as an impor-
tant factor in a determination to disregard the corporate ent-
ity."' Although the concept of estoppel, as used in this context,
does not mean that all the elements of a common law estop-
pel"" must be met,'"' the two notions are clearly related. In a
' Fuller, One-Man Corporations, 51 HARV. L. REV. 1373, 1381 (1938).
Hamilton, supra note 49, at 990.
"' Id. at 991.
.7 Professor Fuller advocated personal liability of a sole shareholder in this situa-
tion. Fuller, supra note 114, at 1379. See also Bartle v. Home Owners Cooperative,
Inc., 127 N.E.2d 832, 140 N.Y.S.2d 512 (1955) (court refused to pierce the corporate
veil where "outward indicia of. . . separate corporations was at all times maintained
. . . [and] creditors were in no wise misled .... Id. at 833).
"' See generally H. BALLANTINE, supra note 88, at 294 (1946).
" POWELL, supra note 33, at § 13(e).
22 A good statement of the common law doctrine of estoppel is found in 1 S.
WILLISTON, LAW OF CONTRACTS § 139 (3d ed. 1957) wherein the author states:
It is generally held that representations of fact made to a party who relies
thereon with the right to so rely may not be denied by the party making the
representations if such denial would result in injury or damage to the relying
party.
2M, POWELL, supra note 33, at § 13(e).
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decision to disregard the corporate entity, "estoppel" describes
a court's response if misrepresentations have been made or if
deceptive appearances have been permitted to go uncorrected.
In that situation it may be unfair to respect the limited liability
of the owners of the corporation.
One typical situation is an indication by the controlling
shareholder that he will guarantee the obligations of the corpo-
ration. Thus, where the, parent gave "assurances that it would
back up [the subsidiary's] . . . obligations"'22 or where the
owners of a corporation indicated that they "stood behind" a
lease taken by their corporation,1 23 courts considered these to
be important factors in deciding whether to disregard corporate
entity.
Another type of misrepresentation can occur if the com-
plaining party is not made aware of the fact he is dealing with
a corporation. In that situation he can be misled into believing
that all the assets of an individual are available to settle any
claims he may have. This was the view expressed in Shafford
v. Otto Sales Company,'24 where the California court, while
placing primary emphasis on undercapitalization and failure to
issue stock, emphasized that the plaintiff thought he was deal-
ing with the majority shareholder personally.
It is important to note that this element of estoppel is
independent of any action for fraud and deceit, which a party
may have against the owners of a corporation. If the plaintiff
can establish the element of common law deceit against the
owners, he clearly could recover under that theory.125 Estoppel,
as it is used in the cases involving a piercing of the corporate
veil, is simply one factor that is considered in determining
whether fairness requires the disregard of the corporate entity.
As one court has stated, "It is not a question of whether plain-
tiff was actually defrauded but whether he is bound to accept
as facts the illusions the defendant created. ' 2
in G.E.J. Corp. v. Uranium Aire, Inc., 311 F.2d 749 (9th Cir. 1962).
" Weisser v. Mursam Shoe Corp., 127 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1942).
124 Shafford v. Otto Sales Co., 308 P.2d 428 (Cal. 1957).
' See generally W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 685-86 (4th ed. 1971) for the elements
of recovery for deceit.
2I Hiehle v. Torrance Millworks, Inc., 272 P.2d 780, 784 (Cal. 1954).
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6. Deadly Combination
It is impossible to state that any particular combination
of the foregoing factors will result in a disregard of the corpo-
rate entity. After extensive research, however, one does arrive
at certain general conclusions. One such conclusion is that ex-
cessive shareholder control and undercapitalization are present
in virtually every case in which the corporate entity is disre-
garded.' 2 Also, cases in which the owners of a corporation are
held liable for corporate obligations usually involve at least one
of the other above-discussed factors. 12 In light of this, any per-
son who owns a corporation creates a substantial risk of per-
sonal liability if he dominates the day-to-day affairs of the
corporation and the corporation is undercapitalized. Further,
the presence of any of the other factors described above in-
creases the probability of a disregard of the corporate entity.
C. Kentucky Cases
Kentucky cases 29 indicate that, in an appropriate in-
'2 Consolidated Sun Ray, Inc. v. Oppenstein, 335 F.2d 801 (8th Cir. 1964); G.E.J.
Corp. v. Uranium Aire, Inc., 311 F.2d 749 (9th Cir. 1962); Weisser v. Mursam Shoe
Corp., 127 F.2d 334 (2d Cir. 1942); Automotriz Del Golfo De California v. Resnick,
306 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1957); Remme v. Herzog, 35 Cal. Rptr. 586 (Cal. Ct. App. 1963); Zaist
v. Olson, 227 A.2d 552 (Conn. 1967).
128 E.g., G.E.J. Corp. v. Uranium Aire, Inc., 311 F.2d 749 (9th Cir. 1962) (estop-
pel).
i2 Up to this point I have utilized only contract cases. When one begins to analyze
the law in Kentucky, however, the dearth of cases on the subject makes such an
approach impossible. There simply are not enough contract cases to give one an accur-
ate projection of when a Kentucky court would pierce the corporate veil in a contract
situation. Accordingly, it was necessary to consider cases other than contract cases.
Since these non-contract cases are generally limited to tort cases, an appropriate
question is whether tort cases are authority for contract situations. Generally, the same
factors that are relevant to the determination to disregard the corporate entity in a
tort case are relevant in a contract case. Thus, for example, tort cases emphasize such
factors as undercapitalization and disregard of corporate formalities as relevant to the
decision of whether the corporate entity should be disregarded. See H. HENN, HAND-
BOOK OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONs 254 (2d ed. 1970). In fact, tort and contract cases
are sometimes treated together by commentators. See, e.g., H. BALLANTINE, supra note
88, at 298; N. LATIN, supra note 61, at 72-79.
This is not to say, however, that the factors considered in tort cases are identical
to the contract situation. One obvious difference is that in the contract situations the
parties can choose the assets that are to be subjected to liability. In the tort situation,
however, this is not true. Thus it has been suggested that undercapitalization should
be more important in the tort situation, as that plaintiff has not chosen to deal with
defendant. See Hamilton, supra note 49, at 988.
1975]
HeinOnline  -- 63 Ky. L.J. 47 1974-1975
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
stance, the corporate entity will be disregarded and the owners
will be held liable for the debts of the corporation. Language
from one case states that the courts will look beyond the corpo-
rate shell if the corporation is "the business conduit or alter
ego" of the owners.' 3 Another case states that the court will "on
appropriate occasions ignore the distinction between . .. [a
parent and a subsidiary corporation] where its recognition
would operate as a shield for fraudulent or criminal acts where
subversive of the public policy of a state."'' 3'
While it is clear that the Court of Appeals will disregard
the corporate entity in some instances, its past decisions are of
minimal help in assessing the present state of the law. Initially,
one is confronted by the problem that there are a limited num-
ber of reported cases in which this issue has been raised. More-
over, since most of those decisions are forty or more years old,
there could be some doubts as to their continued vitality as
precedent.
Finally, the attitude of the Kentucky Court - a general
aversion for any disregard of the corporate entity - has con-
tributed to the uncertainty. While this attitude is, in itself,
some indication of the present state of the law, it has contrib-
uted to the lack of clarity in this area. One result of this posi-
tion is that there is an extremely limited number of cases in
which the corporate entity has been disregarded, 3 2 and conse-
quently there is little indication of what combination of factors
would result in a disregard of the corporate entity. Addition-
ally, this grudging attitude has often caused courts to dismiss
claims against owners with almost no discussion,1 33 a practice
which further contributes to the uncertainty.
,' Smith v. Henry Knight & Son, 277 S.W. 290 (Ky. 1925) (involving an attempt
to find liability against a corporation under the same control as the corporation enter-
ing the contract).
'1' Big Four Mills, Ltd. v. Commercial Credit Co., 211 S.W.2d 831 (Ky. 1948). See
also Lowery Watkins Mortgage Co. v. Turley-Bullington Mortgage Co., 58 S.W.2d 591
(Ky. 1933) (defendant sued on a debt attempted to assert as a set-off liability against
the owners of corporate plaintiff); Ayer & Lord Tie Co. v. Commonwealth, 271 S.W.
693 (Ky. 1925) (parent and subsidiary claiming one entity for tax purposes).
132 One case in which the Court did disregard the corporate entity was Louisville
& Nashville R. Co. v. Carter, 10 S.W.2d 1064 (Ky. 1927). Although that case was a
tort case, it does indicate the factors necessary to disregard the corporate entity.
"I See, e.g., Gravel Switch & Little South Tel. Co. v. Lebonnon L. & L. Tel. Co.,
129 S.W. 559 (Ky; 1910). In that case the Kentucky Court, with no analysis, dismissed
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An examination of the reported cases, however, reveals
nothing radical in the Kentucky approach. On the contrary,
the Kentucky Court of Appeals appears to be sensitive to the
same factors as the courts in other jurisdictions. The cases in
Kentucky thus place heavy emphasis upon the requirement of
control.' 3 ' An example is Smith v. Henry Knight & Son,'3 in
which the plaintiff had contracted with Louisville Rendering
Company (LRC) to sell the latter a quantity of dry blood.
When LRC refused to accept delivery or make payments called
for by the contract, the plaintiff sued Henry Knight & Son
(Knight), alleging that Knight was liable under the contract
because it was the alter-ego of LRC. In rejecting the plaintiff's
claim, the Court emphasized that there was "no evidence in
the record that the Henry Knight & Son Corporation in any
way controlled the Louisville Rendering Company. . . . "The
Court later expressed the importance of control by saying that
"[in order to hold one corporation liable for the debts of
another, it must appear that they are the business conduits or
the alter ego of one another."'3
While control does appear to be a prerequisite for a disre-
gard of the corporate entity, the Court has indicated that con-
trol alone is not enough to cause that result. As it once noted,
the fact that the one corporation exercised a controlling influ-
ence over the other through the ownership of its stock or
through the identity of stockholders [does not] operate to
make either the agent of the other or to merge the two corpo-
rations into one.'37
Again, this is consistent with other jurisdictions.
There is also some indication that the Kentucky courts
would consider the notion of estoppel in determining whether
a claim that the corporate entity of a subsidiary corporation should be disregarded.
The Court simply stated, "[A]lithough [the parent] may own all the stock in the
[subsidiary], it is not liable for the breach by that company of its contracts. A
stockholder in a . . .company is not liable for the obligations of the company." Id. at
562. Accord, Big Four Mills Ltd. v. Commercial Credit Co., 211 S.W.2d 831, 834 (Ky.
1948).
" The absence of control appears to have been an important factor in the Court's
refusal to disregard the corporate entity in Southeastern Greyhound Lines v. Harden's
Adm'x, 136 S.W.2d 42 (Ky. 1940).
' 277 S.W. 290 (Ky. 1925).
"' Id. at 291.
,3 H. Richmond & Irvine Constr. Co. v. Richmond, Nicholasville, Irvine & Beatty-
ville R.R., 68 F. 105 (6th Cir. 1895).
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to disregard the corporate entity. In Richmond & Irvine
Construction Company v. Richmond, Nicholasville, Irvine &
Beattyville Railroad Company, '38 Richmond & Irvine Con-
struction Company had entered into a contract with Ohio Val-
ley Improvement & Contract Company to complete construc-
tion of a railroad. Subsequently, the construction company at-
tempted to hold Richmond, Nicholasville, Irvine & Beattyville
Railroad Co. liable under the terms of the contract. In refusing
to so hold, the Court emphasized that the liabilities of the
parties at the time of the signing were made clear. It stated that
there was
no pretense of any fraudulent concealment of the interest of
the corporation in the other. . . . With this knowledge of the
relations of each corporation to the other, it deliberately en-
tered into a contract with the contract company .... "I
Although this case is nearly 80 years old, it does suggest that a
Kentucky court would consider representations and disclosures
in deciding whether to disregard the corporate entity.
The maintenance of corporate formalities also appears to
be an important factor in Kentucky cases. In Pike Motor Com-
pany v. Adams,'4 ° J.W. Tomblin, Jr. was a shareholder in both
Tomblin-Ford Company, Inc. and Pike Motor Company, Inc.
When Tomblin-Ford Company was unable to perform its part
of a lease agreement with Adams, Adams sued Pike Motor
Company and J.W. Tomblin, Jr. In reversing a lower court's
decision holding J.W. Tomblin, Jr. and Pike Motor Company
liable, the Court emphasized that the plaintiff had failed to
show that the affairs of the corporations were commingled:
It was conclusively shown the Pike Motor Co., Inc., and
Tomblin-Ford Co., Inc., were separate and distinct corporate
entities, and their only relationship was that of debtor and
creditor. An effort was made on the part of appellees to prove
these two corporations had commingled their property, but it
is our view the evidence fell far short of establishing such a
fact.'4'
138 Id.
,"I Id. at 108.
to 380 S.W.2d 94 (Ky. 1964).
,' Id. at 95.
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Likewise, in C.L.&L. Motor Express Co. v. Achenback,4 2
a case in which the plaintiff unsuccessfully attempted to hold
the defendant-corporation liable for a tort committed by a sis-
ter corporation, the Court emphasized the separateness of the
two corporations. The Court stated that although the two cor-
porations occupied the same premises and shared employees,
"the C.L.&L. Company was charged with rental by the Union
Company" and "each [company] was charged with a propro-
tionate part of [the employees'] salaries. 1 3 In that situation,
the Court refused to pierce the corporate veil because corporate
formalities were strictly adhered to.'44
While not specifically articulated by the Kentucky courts,
it appears that they have given some weight to the enterprise
entity theory advanced by Professor Berle. An example is
Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Carter,' a case in which the plaintiff
successfully sued the parent company for injuries caused by the
negligence of the subsidiary. While there were other factors
involved in the Court's decision, one important factor was that
the subsidiary railroad had become an indistinguishable part
of the larger economic unit of the parent.
While it is difficult to predict what factual combination
would persuade a Kentucky court to disregard the corporate
entity, further examination of the preceeding case establishes
some guidelines.'46 In that case the plaintiff was injured when
a train operated by the Frankfort & Cincinnati Railroad Com-
pany collided with an automobile. The trial court rendered a
decision in favor of the plaintiff, disregarding the corporate
entity of Frankfort & Cincinnati and holding the parent
corporation, the L & N Railroad, liable. In affirming this deci-
sion the Court of Appeals placed primary emphasis on three
factors. The first was the complete domination of Frankfort &
1' 82 S.W.2d 335 (Ky. 1935). This case involved an action based upon tort, rather
than contract. Nevertheless, the Court tends to look at the same factors to determine
liability. For a discussion of the applicability of tort cases, see note 129 supra.
" Id. at 338.
14 Other factors were important in the Court's decision. For example, one of the
stockholders and officers was connected with only one of the companies. The Court also
emphasized that there was no ulterior purpose involved in the relationship between
the two companies.
"4 10 S.W.2d 1064 (Ky. 1927).
116 Id.
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Cincinnati by L & N. The Court stated that the general man-
ager of Frankfort & Cincinnati "took no action involving any
matter of policy without first consulting the officers of...
IL & NI."' 47Second, there had been a commingling of the
affairs of the two companies. Finally, some emphasis was
placed on the fact that there was, in reality, only one economic
unit. With these factors present, the Court upheld the liability
of the parent company.
In summary, the Kentucky courts have recognized that the
corporate entity should be disregarded in an appropriate in-
stance. Further, while the evidence is somewhat thin, it ap-
pears that the Kentucky courts emphasize the same factors as
do the courts of other jurisdictions. As a matter of attitude,
however, the Kentucky Court of Appeals has been quite reluc-
tant to disregard the corporate entity.
D. Conclusions
Where necessary to prevent unfairness, a court should dis-
regard the corporate entity and hold the owner liable on the
contractual obligation of the corporation. While most courts
appear to accept this notion, some of the factors they typically
select to establish the presence or absence of unfairness are ill-
suited to that task. In defining which acts manifest unfairness,
the contractual nature of the obligation must be considered.
Accordingly, when a court is faced with the question of whether
an owner should be held liable on a corporate obligation, the
reasonable expectations of the plaintiff become critical. If the
owner of the corporation has acted in a manner that defeats the
reasonable expectation of the plaintiff, that act should be de-
fined as unfair. If the problem of unfairness is framed in this
manner, some of the previously discussed factors often relied
upon by courts lose their significance.
1. Control
In deciding whether to disregard the corporate entity, it is
appropriate to limit liability to shareholders who had control
over the corporation. It would be grossly unfair to hold a 1%
shareholder of a large corporation personally liable on a corpo-
"I Id. at 1067.
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rate obligation, if that shareholder had no control over the
corporation. On the other hand, if a shareholder had enough
control to have prevented the particular unfairness, it is appro-
priate to hold that person liable. This is consistent with the
equitable nature of this doctrine.
This is not to say, however, that the exercise of control is
an inherently unfair act. There is nothing "bad" about an
owner of a corporation exercising complete and absolute con-
trol over his corporation. That right to control is an integral
and legitimate part of owning a corporation. Accordingly, con-
trol should be defined as a limiting factor. It merely defines
which owners of the corporation may bear personal liability for
the unfair act.4 8
2. Undercapitalization
It is entirely sound to consider undercapitalization as an
unfair act that necessitates the disregard of the corporate
entity. One who signs a contract with a corporation should be
entitled to assume that the corporation has a reasonable
amount of capitalization from which he could recover in the
event of a breach. Such an expectation is reasonable and justi-
fiable.' Accordingly, if the corporation is undercapitalized, it
is unfair to limit the plaintiff's recovery to the insufficient as-
sets owned by the corporation.
This notion, however, must be reconciled with the right of
a corporation, or any party to a contract, to limit those assets
available to satisfy a contractual obligation. Unquestionably,
a corporation has the right to extract an agreement from a
creditor that the creditor will look only to the assets of the
corporation, even if the corporation is undercapitalized. Such
an agreement, however, should not be presumed, absent proof
of a complete disclosure by the undercapitalized corporation.
The proper reconciliation of these concepts can be effected
in the following manner. It normally should be presumed that
"I This notion appears implicit in some court language. E.g., Sirmons v. Arnold
Lumber Co., 167 So. 2d 588 (Fla. 1964) ("The corporate veil will not be pierced when
it is not shown that the corporation was used to mislead creditors or for fraudulent
purposes; without more the mere fact that one or more individuals control the corpo-
rate activities is not sufficient to justify imposition of the corporate debt upon the
shareholders .... Id. at 589-90).
,, But see Hamilton, supra note 49, at 986-88; 28 OHIo ST. L.J. 441,458-59 (1967).
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one contracting with a corporation has agreed to look only to
the assets of the corporation for satisfaction of his claim. If,
however, the complaining party can show that at the time
the contract was signed, the corporation was undercapitalized,
then the competing interest of preventing unfairness requires
the normal rule to be suspended, and the party that contracted
with the corporation should be permitted to disregard the cor-
porate entity. There should be, however, one exception to this
analysis. The corporate entity should not be disregarded, not-
withstanding that there was undercapitalization, if the defen-
dant can show that the precarious financial position of the
corporation was disclosed and that the contracting party none-
theless agreed to look only to the assets of the corporation.
It should be noted that the above analysis measures inade-
quacy from the date the obligation was incurred, as opposed to
the more traditional date of incorporation. Such an approach
comports vith the purpose for disregarding the corporate ent-
ity. Unfairness in such situations occurs because the capitaliza-
tion is less than the amount the creditor bargained for and the
security of his "investment" is accordingly impaired. The pro-
tection for creditors results from adequate capitalization at the
time the obligation was incurred; capitalization at the initial
incorporation is only incidentally related to this.
3. Splitting the Economic Unit and Maintenance of Corpo-
rate Formalities
It is difficult to understand why the splitting of a single
economic unit should be a factor in a decision to disregard the
corporate entity. Assuming there is adequate capitalization of
the corporation and there is no misunderstanding as to which
entity is liable under the contract, an individual or parent cor-
poration should be allowed to fragment its business as it
wishes. Unfairness occurs only when the subsidiary is either
undercapitalized or when the party contracting with the sub-
sidiary is misled into thinking that the entire economic unit is
liable for the contract. In those two situations, however, it is
not the splitting of the economic unit that generates unfairness.
Both undercapitalization and misrepresentation engender un-
fairness independently of the split in the economic enterprise.
As with the splitting of the economic unit, it is difficult to
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understand why the failure to maintain corporate formalities
should be a factor in a decision to disregard the corporate ent-
ity. As stated earlier, commentators have correctly observed
that no harm is caused a corporate creditor by failure to main-
tain the formalities of corporate existence.
4. Estoppel
If the corporate entity is to be disregarded in order to in-
sure fairness, it is rational to apply concepts of estoppel. It
would be unfair to permit an owner of a corporation to make
misrepresentations with impunity. Whether or not these misre-
presentations would consitute common law deceit, this should
be a factor considered by a court in determining whether to
permit the owner of a corporation to hide behind the corporate
veil. Applying an estoppel concept protects the reasonable ex-
pectations of one contracting with a corporation.
V. CREDITOR'S Surr TO ENFORCE A FIDUCIARY DuTY
In addition to the personal liability a shareholder may face
if the corporate entity is disregarded, one who owns shares in
a corporation may also incur personal liability, if while in-
volved in the management of the corporation, the corporation
is damaged as a result of his negligence.'50 Conceptually, this
liability is distinct from any notion of disregarding the corpo-
rate entity in that it arises not from mere ownership of part of
a corporation, but rather because of impropriety in a manage-
ment function. Further, a breach of this duty is generally con-
sidered a wrong against the corporation. Accordingly, the cause
of action must be enforced either by the corporation or deriva-
tively by a shareholder in the right of the corporation.
If, however, a corporate creditor could sue the officers,
directors or majority shareholders for harm caused by negligent
management of the corporate affairs, this would be a signifi-
cant protection for the creditors of a corporation and, as a
practical matter, would expose the owners of corporations to
more danger of personal liability. This is especially true of
closely held corporations, where directors, officers and share-
"' For a discussion of the liability of corporate officers, directors and controlling
shareholders, see N. LATTIN, supra note 61, at 272-334, 410-463.
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holders are usually the same people; in such cases the owners
of a corporation would lose their limited liability, at least to the
extent that their mismanagement caused the corporation's ina-
bility to meet the debt owed the corporate creditor.
A. Creditors' Rights in Non-Bankruptcy Situations
In a number of cases, corporate creditors have argued that
the management of the corporate debtor owes a fiduciary duty
directly to its creditors, and, consequently, that those creditors
have standing to enforce that right directly for their own bene-
fit. In most of these cases corporate creditors have attempted
to sue officers and directors for mismanagement that has ren-
dered the corporation unable to pay its debts.1 51 Although there
is authority to the contrary, courts have usually been reluctant
to impose this liability on corporate management. Ballantine
has said that "[c]reditors have no direct right of action
against directors or officers for mismanagement . . . by the
better view."'' '1 2
There is certainly substantial authority for this proposi-
tion, as exemplified by Sutton v. Regan & Gee. 53 In that case
the corporate creditors sued the directors of the company,
alleging that they should be liable, inter alia, because of their
negligent failure to prevent the corporation's financial losses.
The court held that the jury's finding of mismanagement would
not support recovery by the creditors, because the primary in-
jury from this negligence was to the corporation and conse-
quently the right to recover was regarded as a corporate asset.
The court stated that it was the "general rule that a creditor
who sues solely on his own behalf cannot maintain a personal
action against directors who, by negligent mismanagement of
the corporation's affairs, have breached their duty to the corpo-
ration to the consequent injury of its creditors."' 51
Numerous other cases have also held that corporate credi-
tors have no direct cause of action against the officers and
"I, See generally 3 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF CORPORATIONS §§ 1180-84 (Perm.
ed. 1965).
'"' H. BALLANTINE, supra note 88, at 184.
,5' 405 S.W.2d 828 (Tex. 1966).
' Id. at 835.
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directors for mismanagement. 5 One reason courts have been
reluctant to find a direct fiduciary duty is the absence of any
legal relationship between the corporate creditor and the corpo-
rate management that would engender such a duty. Thus,
courts have generally concluded that the management is not
the trustee of the creditors.156 Further, since the officer is the
agent of the corporation and since under the law of agency a
negligent agent is not directly liable to the creditors of his
principal, the courts have yet another basis for denying the
corporate creditor a direct action against the negligent director
or officer.'57
Although the above stated rule is widely accepted,'58 there
is authority to the contrary. 5 Especially in older cases one
sometimes encounters statements that:
any failure of a director to exercise diligence or good faith
which results in loss to a stockholder or creditor entitles such
stockholder or creditor to require the directors whose negli-
gence have [sic] caused the loss to pay. In other words, the
Is' Nuclear Corp. of America v. Hale, 355 F. Supp. 193 (N.D. Tex. 1973); Skinner
v. Hulsey, 138 So. 769 (Fla. 1931) ("Directors are not liable to the creditors on the
theory of their being fiduciaries." Id. at 773); Confick v. Houston Civic Opera Ass'n,
99 S.W.2d 382 (Tex. 1936) ("Directors are not personally liable to creditors for misman-
agement, or for waste of assets except on proof of the commission of such fraud." Id.
at 385); Equitable Life & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Inland Printing Co., 484 P.2d 162 (Utah
1971); Anderson v. Bundy, 171 S.E. 501 (Va. 1933); Wheeling Kitchen Equip. Co. v.
R. & R. Sewing Centre, Inc., 179 S.E.2d 587 (W. Va. 1971); Inter-Ocean Cas. Co. v.
Lecony Smokeless Fuel Co., 17 S.E.2d 51 (W. Va. 1941). See the cases cited in R.
BAKER & W. CARY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 620 (3d ed. 1959).
"' Skinner v. Hulsey, 138 So. 769 (Fla. 1931) ("It is difficult to perceive upon
what principle a director of a corporation can be considered a trustee of its creditors."
Id. at 769.) W. FLETCHER, supra note 148, §§ 1180-91.
"I' H. BALLANTINE, supra note 88, at 185-86; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §
352 (1958) states that "an agent is not liable for harm to a person other than his
principal because of. . . [the agent's] failure adequately to perform his duties to his
principal, unless physical harm results from reliance upon performance of the duties
by the agent, or unless the agent has taken control of land or other tangible things.";.
Whitfield v. Kern, 192 A. 48, 55 (N.J. 1937) ("Directors . . . are no more account-
able to the creditors for mismanagement of the corporate affairs than the agent of an
individual would be to his principal's creditors.").
"' W. CARY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 865 (4th ed. 1969) ("This rule
is usually applied to corporations and a creditor or class of creditors: only the corpora-
tion has a cause of action against the officer or director."); R. BAKER & W. CARY, supra
note 155, at 620 (3d ed. 1959).
I" Fletcher has stated that "[tihe weight of authority is in favor of permitting a
recovery by creditors." W. FLETCHER, supra note 151, at § 1182; see the cases cited in
R. BAKER & W. CARY, supra note 155, at 621.
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director whose negligence causes loss is liable for such loss to
stockholders and creditors.'6'
An example of the application of this rule is found in Anthony
v. Jeifress,"'G a case in which a corporate creditor sued the
corporation's directors for mismanagement of the corporation.
The court found that the directors had been negligent in their
running of the company, apparently because of their general
inattention to corporate affairs.12 Accordingly, the court re-
versed the lower court's judgment for defendant, holding that
"[tihe law . . . holds [directors] . . . responsible for dam-
ages sustained by stockholders and creditors by reason of their
negligence, fraud or deceit.' 6 3
In a more recent case, the United States Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit, applying Massachusetts' law, indicated
that corporate officers and directors may be directly liable to
corporate creditors for mismanagement. In W.H. Elliot & Sons
Co. v. Gotthardt,'14 a judgment creditor of King Company
brought an action against King's officers and directors for a
"violation of their fiduciary obligation to creditors of King
Company."'6 5 Specifically, the judgment creditors alleged that,
subsequent to their obtaining a judgment against King, the
defendants permitted the diversion of corporate opportunities
away from the company. The lower court had granted a sum-
mary judgment in favor of two of the defendants, but on appeal
the decision was reversed with respect to one of the officers.'66
The court stated:
I Steinberg v. Blaine, 17 S.W.2d 286, 288 (Ark. 1929). See also Johnson v. Cole-
man, 20 S.W.2d 186 (Ark. 1929). Both cases applied the rule to directors; both found
the directors free from negligent conduct.
16, 90 S.E. 414 (N.C. 1916).
,62 The harm to the plaintiffs resulted when Wooten, president of the company,
willfully misrepresented the company's solvency to plaintiff, upon the faith of which
plaintiff sold goods to the company. The claim against the directors was that their
inattention permitted this to happen.
163 Anthony v. Jeffress, 90 S.E. 414, 415 (N.C. 1916). In a recent case, however,
the Supreme Court of North Carolina indicated that a creditor of a corporation could
not sue the directors directly for mismanagement. The Court held that "[b]efore a
creditor or stockholder may sue those guilty of mismanagement, he must allege a
demand on the corporation, or its receiver if insolvent, to bring the suit and a refusal
to do so." This was because the "claim of mismanagement exists in favor of the
corporation." Goodwin v. Whitener, 138 S.E.2d 232, 233 (N.C. 1964).
305 F.2d 544 (1st Cir. 1962).
,63 Id. at 545.
,66 The summary judgment in favor of one defendant was affirmed because his
position in the company was judged too minor to generate liability.
[Vol. 63
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The Massachusetts cases with regard to the liability of corpo-
rate directors and officers to creditors for breach of their fidu-
ciary obligations to creditors, or to the corporation itself,
make it clear that the court has imposed liability . . .on
corporate directors and major corporate officers.'67
This doctrine found its furthest application in Swinney v.
Keebler Co.,'65 where the Federal District Court for South Car-
olina indicated that a majority shareholder may owe a fidu-
ciary duty to creditors. Although it has been recognized for
some time that majority shareholders owe fiduciary duties to
the corporation,' 9 Keebler seems to have expanded the duty to
protect creditors and, further, to have revitalized the notion of
a fiduciary duty running from the management of a corporation
to corporate creditors. 70
In Keebler, Keebler Company, owner of all the stock of
Meadors, Inc., sold all its Meadors stock to Atlantic Services,
Inc. The plaintiffs, debenture holders of Meadors, brought an
action "on behalf of themselves and other debenture holders,"
alleging that Keebler's sale of its Meadors stock to Atlantic
violated Keebler's fiduciary duty to creditors because Atlantic
subsequently looted the assets of Meadors 71 and because a rea-
"' W. H. Elliott & Sons Co. v. Gotthardt, 305 F.2d 544, 545 (1st Cir. 1962).
" 329 F. Supp. 216 (D.S.C. 1971).
"' See H. HENN, supra note 126, at 475 ("Controlling shareholders, especially
when approving extraordinary corporate matters requiring shareholder approval, are
usually subjected to fiduciary duties.").
"18 Although the case was reversed on appeal, 480 F.2d 573 (4th Cir. 1973), the
circuit court opinion was based on a finding that there was no unreasonable conduct
on the part of Keebler. The court stated that "if the sellers of control are in a position
to foresee the likelihood of fraud on the corporation, including its creditors . . . , or
on the remaining stockholders, at the hands of the transferee, their fiduciary duty
imposes a positive duty to investigate ..... Id. at 578.
"I' The looting took the form of Atlantic's paying for the purchase of the Meadors
stock ($230,000) with cash from Meadors' assets, substituting for the cash an account
payable from Atlantic to Meadors for the amount of cash used. Subsequently, Atlantic
sold Meadors to Flora Mir Distributing Company (a company with negligible assets)
for $352,000. Again, the purchasing company (this time Flora Mir) utilized the assets
of Meadors to finance the purchase. As a result of the second transaction, Atlantic was
able to pay its $230,000 owed to Meadors, with an additional $122,000 left as profit.
For the assets used by Flora Mir to pay Atlantic, an account payable from Flora Mir
was entered on the books of Meadors. At the end of these transactions, "Keebler had
$230,000; Atlantic Services had $122,000 net and Meadors to whom the plaintiff credi-
tors looked had a $352,000 account receivable from a corporation with no assets."
Swinney v. Keebler Co., 329 F. Supp. 216, 219 (D.S.C. 1971).
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sonable investigation of Atlantic by Keebler would have dis-
closed Atlantic as a corporate raider. In summarizing the plain-
tiffs' argument the court stated:
[p]laintiffs place their principal reliance upon the theory
that the owners of a controlling interest in a corporation owe
a fiduciary duty to the corporation's creditors as well as
stockholders . . . .No matter that the controlling share-
holder may have [the power to sell his control] . . . , it is
subject to the equitable limitation that it may not be used for
the benefit of the fiduciary at the expense of the "community
of interests in the corporation - creditors as well as stock-
holders." 72
The court held that in failing to reasonably investigate the
purchaser of the Meadors stock, Keebler breached this fidu-
ciary duty. The court further stated that, although "it is not
clear whether as a practical or legal matter that liability is to
Meadors or the debenture holders... the judgment, when the
amount of damages has been determined, will take such form
as is necessary to make the debenture holders whole.' 73
While Keebler indicates that the corporate creditor may
172 Id. at 222 (citation omitted).
"I Id. at 225. In reaching its decision, the court in Keebler apparently relied on
language from Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939). In Pepper the Supreme Court
disallowed a claim by a judgment creditor against a bankrupt corporation. The reason
for disallowing that claim was that the claimant, who was also the controlling and
dominant shareholder of the bankrupt corporation, had utilized a "planned and frau-
dulent scheme" to attain an unwarranted claim to the assets of the bankrupt corpora-
tion. The Supreme Court made it clear, however, that a breach of a fiduciary duty (as
opposed to actual fraud) by a majority shareholder could also result in his claim being
disallowed or subordinated to othe~r creditors. The Court stated:
While normally that fiduciary obligation is enforceable directly by the corpo-
ration, or through a stockholder's derivative action, it is, in the event of
bankruptcy of the corporation, enforceable by the trustee. For that standard
of fiduciary obligation is designed for the protection of the entire community
of interests in the corporation - creditors as well as stockholders. Id. at 307.
Pepper v. Litton does not hold that a corporate creditor can sue a majority share-
holder for a breach of fiduciary duty. Rather, it holds that claims of a majority share-
holder against a bankrupt corporation will be disallowed if those claims have been
unfairly obtained. The court did indicate, however, that a violation of a majority
shareholder's fiduciary duty to the corporation will generate liability that can be en-
forced by the trustee. This would result in benefit to the creditors, as the bankrupt
estate would be increased by the amount of any judgment received. See the discussion
at part V of this article. Absent bankruptcy, however, the Court stated that
"[niormally ...[a] fiduciary obligation is enforceable directly by the corporation,
or through a stockholder's derivative action .... Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. at 307.
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have a remedy against a majority shareholder for the latter's
negligent act, one conceptual problem remains - whether the
creditor can enforce the action directly in his own right or
whether he is required to enforce it in a derivative action.
Keebler is equivocal on this point. There, the action was
brought by "holders of subordinated debentures of Meadors
. . . on behalf of themselves and other debenture holders
... )714 At one point, however, the court stated the issue in
terms of whether the defendants breached a fiduciary duty
owed to Meadors. 7 5
Normally the breach of a fiduciary duty by a corporate
officer, director, or majority shareholder generates liability
that may be enforced by the corporation.' 8 Since harm to the
corporation is also harm to its shareholders, a procedure has
developed by which a shareholder can enforce the right of the
corporation against the officer, director or majority share-
holder."17 The prosecution of this derivative right, however, is
subject to certain requirements. One of these is that the plain-
tiff must be a shareholder of the corporation. 7 Accordingly,
creditors are generally thought to have no right to sue deriva-
tively "in the shoes of" the corporation.' 9 The court in Keebler,
however, clearly indicated that, at least in one jurisdiction, the
corporate creditor has a remedy. Further, the court indicated
that if liabity does not run directly to the creditors then it at
least runs to the corporation, and, apparently, can be enforced
as a derivative right by the creditors.
There are other cases that likewise seem to support the
right of a corporate creditor to bring a derivative action. In
Anderson v. Bundy,10 depositors of an insolvent bank brought'
" Swinney v. Keebler Co., 329 F. Supp. 216 (D.S.C. 1971).
"'Id. at 218.
"' N. LArrIN, supra note 61, at 410.
' For a discussion of derivative suits, see H. BALLANME, supra note 88, at 333-
74.
" While it is generally agreed that the plaintiff must have been a shareholder at
the time of the commencement of the suit, there is a split as to the additional require-
ment that the plaintiff also have been a shareholder at the time of the wrong. H. HENN,
supra note 129, at 761-69; Dyrstra, Revival of the Derivative Suit, 116 U. PA. L. REV.
74, 94-97 (1967).
"' H. BALLANTINE, supra note 88, at 351; 13 W. FLETCHER, supra note 151, at §
5972.2.
,80 171 S.E. 501 (Va. 1933).
1975]
HeinOnline  -- 63 Ky. L.J. 61 1974-1975
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
an action against the directors of the bank alleging that the
bank's failure had been caused by the negligence of the direc-
tors. After holding that "directors must exercise ordinary care
and prudence in the protection of their depositors"'"' and that
the directors had failed to exercise such care, the court dis-
cussed the depositors' remedy:
It is clearly the law, at least in most jurisdictions, and cer-
tainly in Virginia, that no direct action lies to a creditor of a
corporation against its directors who are its agents . . . for
improper performance or failure in performance of their du-
ties. This is a right belonging to the corporation only ....
The creditors must sue, not for any direct right of action in
them but in the right of the corporation, after the corpora-
tion, or its proper representatives have refused to act."'
In Goodwin v. Whitener' 3 the North Carolina Supreme
Court joined the ranks of the courts that allow a creditor to
prosecute a derivative action.' 4 The plaintiff had a judgment
against a corporation which he was unable to satisfy. An action
was brought against the directors of the corporation, alleging
that the insolvency of the corporation was caused by the "reck-
less, extravagant, and fraudulent schemes and devices" of the
directors. The court held that the plaintiff had not stated a
cause of action, apparently because he had not followed the
procedural requirements necessary for a derivative action.
What is significant, however, is the court's clear implication
that a creditor can sue derivatively in the right of the corpora-
tion. The court stated:
The duties which have been breached by this mismanage-
ment are duties primarily to the corporation. Before a credi-
tor or stockholder may sue those guilty of mismanagement,
he must allege a demand on the corporation, or its receiver if
insolvent, to bring the suit and a refusal to do so. Even then
the corporation must be made a party defendant; and any
recovery must be held for the benefit of the corporation. 5
181 Id. at 506.
882 Id. at 508.
18 138 S.E.2d 232 (N.C. 1964).
,' Accord, Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Minges, 473 F.2d 918 (4th Cir. 1973) (apply-
ing North Carolina law); Underwood v. Stafford, 155 S.E.2d 211 (N.C. 1967).
"8 Goodwin v. Whitener, 318 S.E.2d 232, 233 (N.C. 1964). The requirements expli-
cated are standard to the prosecution of a derivative right by shareholders. See H.
[Vol. 63
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In Kentucky there is at least some language supporting the
right of corporate creditors to sue officers and directors directly
for mismanagement. Generally, however, these cases are old
and the language is dictum. 188 Caldwell v. Ryan1 17 is an exam-
ple. In that case Caldwell, a director of an insolvent bank, had
agreed with the shareholders of the bank to pay the bank's
creditors 75% of amount due them from the bank.' In return,
the shareholders .had agreed not to institute a suit against
Caldwell for his mismanagement of the bank. Ryan, a creditor
of the bank, brought a suit against Caldwell; attempting to
enforce the terms of the agreement as third party beneficiary
in order to recover at least part of the debt owed him by the
insolvent bank. On contract principles the Court decided that
Ryan could enforce the contract, holding that the agreement
between Caldwell and the shareholders "was executed for the
benefit of creditors and it was based on a sufficient considera-
tion." ' Significantly, however, the Court pointed out that
Ryan had an alternate ground for recovery: "The creditors of
the bank. . . had the right to seek indemnity from the direc-
tors if they [the directors] were guilty of negligence in the
management of the bank and this negligence resulted in loss
to them [the creditors].' 9 0
In an earlier case, however, the Kentucky Court had stated
that the right of a creditor to sue for mismanagement was of a
derivative nature. In Savings Bank of Louisville's Assignee v.
Caperton,'9' a creditor (depositor) of the bank brought an ac-
tion against the directors of the insolvent bank for the recovery
of money deposited in the bank. The basis of the action was
that the directors had been negligent in their supervision of a
HENN, supra note 129, at 755-81. There are other cases indicating that a creditor may
be able to obtain relief by a derivative suit. E.g., Browne v. Hammett, 131 S.E. 612
(S.C. 1926) ("The rule regulating action by the creditors in the right of the corporation
is the same as that applied to actions by stockholders." Id. at 615.)
In See Brannin v. Loving, 82 Ky. 370 (1884); United Soc'y of Shakers v. Under-
wood, 72 Ky. 609 (1873).
190 S.W. 1078 (Ky. 1917).
' This was beneficial to shareholders because, under the existing statutes, they
were personally liable for an amount equal to the par value of their stock. Ky. Stat.
§§ 547, 547a (1936) (repealed).
iU Caldwell v. Ryan, 190 S.W. 1078, 1080 (Ky. 1917).
IN Id.
8'  S.W. 885 (Ky. 1888).
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cashier, who had embezzeled $118,000, and that the assignee
for all the assets of the bank had refused to sue. While the
Court ultimately held that the directors had breached no duty,
finding that they had acted with reasonable care and due dili-
gence, the Court first discussed the proper procedure to be
followed by creditors in asserting their rights against negligent
officers and directors. Noting that normally the creditors of a
corporation have no direct cause of action against the directors,
Justice Pryor, writing for the majority, stated that
"I directors are under no personal liability to the creditors of
a bank by reason of a neglect of duty. They are the agents of
the corporation .... 11112 The Court indicated, however, that
it would be unwilling to leave the creditors who were harmed
by directors' negligence without a remedy. Thus, while the
Court decided that such a suit by creditors would be, "at last,
. . . the bank suing the directors. . . for a neglect of duty," it
apparently affirmed the right of creditors to enforce that right,
at least in cases where there was a "refusal of the assignee to
sue. '1 3 It seems, therefore, the Court was allowing creditors to
enforce a derivative right.
Because of the absence of recent Kentucky cases, it would
be dangerous to predict success for a creditor who attempts to
sue the officials of a Kentucky corporation for mismanage-
ment. Such a result is sound, however, and it is submitted that
Kentucky should adopt a rule that permits a creditor such a
right. Indeed even absent precedent, there are compelling rea-
sons for extending such protection to creditors, the most ob-
vious of which is to insure fairness."4 By extending credit to the
corporation, creditors have acquired an interest in the corpora-
tion. They have invested assets or money in the corporation
and, accordingly, expect a return in the form of repayment. If
the corporation becomes unable to meet the repayment obliga-
tion because of the negligent mismanagement of the corporate
"I Id. at 890.
193 Id.
"I As indicated earlier, courts by disregarding the corporate entity have protected
creditors from some types of unfairness at the hands of corporate shareholders. See the
discussion supra at part IV of this article. Thus, such factors as undercapitalization
have led courts to hold shareholders individually liable to corporate creditors. It would
seem consistent to extend the protection to cover harm caused the creditor by manage-
ment's negligence in running the affairs of the corporation.
[Vol. 63
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affairs, creditors should have some recourse. Otherwise there is
an unfair apportionment of loss, unfair because the creditors
must bear a loss created by the negligence of another, over
whom they had no control. Courts should always be reluctant,
when deciding which party should bear a loss, to require the
innocent party to bear the economic loss caused by the negli-
gence of another. Absent a strong policy reason to the contrary,
fairness demands the negligent party be held liable. In this
instance, that party would be the corporate management,
which caused the inability of the corporation to meet its obliga-
tions.
The unfairness to creditors of a denial of relief becomes
even more apparent when one considers that shareholders are
protected from mismanagement by the right to sue deriva-
tively. Creditors, on the other hand, who have essentially the
same investment in and expectation from the corporation, may
be denied any relief. Both creditors and shareholders have in-
vested assets in the corporation; both expect a return. Dispar-
ate treatment is indefensible.'9 5
If a court in Kentucky were inclined to permit creditors the
right to sue management in a derivative action, additional con-
siderations would become important. The first of these is that
there is an apparent conflict with Kentucky Revised Statutes
(hereinafter KRS) § 271A.245. That section of the Kentucky
Business Corporation Act can be read as limiting the use of the
"I5 The assertion in this paper that shareholders and creditors have essentially the
same interest in a corporation will probably generate disagreement from some. I am
well aware that the contractual agreements between the corporation and shareholders
differ significantly from the agreements between the corporation and its creditors. For
example, order of payment on liquidation is different; interest rates and dividends may
differ; creditors may have certain protective provisions not enjoyed by shareholders.
These factors notwithstanding the essence of the shareholder's relationship to the
corporation is the same as the creditor's relationship to the corporation. Both have
invested something of value in the corporation. The shareholder usually invests money.
The creditor, however, may "invest" money (for example, a bank loan), goods (for
example, selling goods to a corporation on credit) or services (for example, a plumber
who does work for a corporation on credit). In any case, value has been invested.
Further, both shareholders and creditors expect a return on their investment. The
amount of the return expected differs, but there is still the basic expectation that the
corporation will pay out something of value. Finally, the expected return in both
instances is dependent on the corporation's management. Therefore, I would contend
that the creditor is essentially in the same situation as the shareholder.
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derivative suit to shareholders of the corporation.'96 It is sug-
gested, however, that permitting a creditor to prosecute a de-
rivative action is not foreclosed by the language of the Ken-
tucky Business Corporation Act. A close examination of KRS
§ 271A.245 reveals nothing that indicates the drafters gave any
consideration to the right of a creditor to institute a derivative
suit. Rather, the section appears to be merely an attempt to
dictate procedure with respect to a particular right: the right
of a shareholder to sue derivatively. The section states: "No
derivative action shall be brought . . . by a person claiming
ownership of shares of a corporation. . . unless .. ,,9" Thus
the section intends only to control shareholders' derivative
suits; not to prohibit derivative suits by non-shareholders.
The origin and development of the derivative suit suggest
its appropriateness as a mechanism to protect creditors. In his
article on the history of the derivative action, Professor Prunty
asserted that "the origin of the derivative suit lies in judicial
recognition of a new wrong or maladjustment for which pre-
existing legal procedures proved more or less inadequate."' 9
Since a "maladjustment" results from the denial of relief to a
corporate creditor who has been injured by mismanagement,
"I Ky. REv. STAT. § 271A.245 (Supp. 1972) [hereinafter cited as KRS]. This
section states:
No derivative action shall be brought in this state in the right of a
domestic or foreign corporation by a person claiming ownership of shares of
the corporation or voting trust certificates therefor unless the plaintiff was
an owner of shares or of voting trust certificates therefor at the time of the
transaction of which he complains, or his shares or voting trust certificates
thereafter devolved upon him by operation of law from a person who owned
them at such time. The complaint shall allege with particularity the efforts,
if any, made by the plaintiff to obtain the action he desires from the directors
or comparable authority and, if necessary, from the shareholders, and the
reasons for his failure to obtain the action or for not making the effort. No
such derivative action shall be dismissed or compromised without the ap-
proval of the court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall
be given to shareholders in such manner as the court directs.
This section is similar to the federal rule. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1. For a discussion of this
federal rule, see 3B J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACNCE 23.1.01 - .25 (2d ed. 1974).
"I KRS § 271A.245 (Supp. 1972).
I's Prunty, The Shareholders Derivative Suit: Notes on its Derivation, 32
N.Y.U.L. REv. 980, 992 (1957). At another point Prunty states that the derivative suit
"was born and nurtured as a corrective for managerial abuse in economic units which
by their nature deprived some participants of an effective voice in their administra-
tion." Id. at 994.
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the derivative suit would seem an appropriate procedure to
remedy this situation. It would be merely a logical extension
of a procedure designed to protect the parties harmed by corpo-
rate mismanagement. 19
Not only do the history and purpose of the derivative suit
support its use to protect creditors, but in addition the rules
governing derivative suits provide protection to creditors. Spe-
cifically, the rule has developed that a pro rata recovery by a
shareholder in a derivative suit is not permitted, except in
exceptional circumstances. 20 Rather, the full corporate loss
must be awarded to, and the recovery is in favor of, the corpo-
ration."1 The purpose for this rule was well stated by the court
in Liken v. Shaffer:
One of the reasons why courts of equity have not allowed
direct proportionate recoveries in stockholder's derivative
suits, has been that the recovery is an asset of the corpora-
tion, and its creditors have first claim upon it; and that to
award such recovery direct to the stockholders leaving any
creditors unpaid, would be fraudulent as to them.212
It seems quite anomalous to prohibit a pro rata recovery by
shareholder because of a need to protect creditors, while pro-
hibiting creditors from instituting a derivative suit in order to
protect themselves.
In summary, creditors, either by a suit in their own right
or by a suit in the right of the corporation, should be permitted
a right of action to remedy harm caused them by manage-
ment's negligence or breach of fiduciary duties. Such a right
has some support from case law. Further, there is support, both
in the history and purpose of derivative suits, for permitting
such recovery derivatively. Finally, and of utmost importance,
such recovery, whether based on a direct fiduciary duty or on
a derivative right, is essential to fair treatment of corporate
creditors.
"' Since the derivative suit was originally a court developed procedure, a court
would seem an appropriate body to expand the doctrine. See H. BALLANTINE, supra
note 88, at § 145; Hornstein, The Shareholder's Derivative Suit in the United States,
1957 J. Bus. L. 282.
See H. HENN, supra note 129, at § 373.
" See W. FLETCHER, supra note 151, at § 6028; N. LATTw, supra note 61, at § 104.
2 Liken v. Shaffer, 64 F. Supp. 432, 441 (N.D. Iowa 1946). Accord, LaHue v.
Keystone Inv. Co., 496 P.2d 343 (Wash. 1972).
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B. Creditors' Rights in Bankruptcy
There is one final procedure by which a corporate creditor
can obtain relief for harm caused him by an officer's, director's
or majority shareholder's mismanagement. This procedure is
found in the Bankruptcy Act. 213 Where the mismanagement
has created the proper conditions, the Bankruptcy Act gives
the creditor important recovery rights. Under section 101(a) of
the Bankruptcy Act, the trustee becomes vested with title to
enumerated assets of the bankrupt.2 14 Specifically vested in the
trustee by virtue of section 101(a)(5) is "property, including
rights of action, which 'prior to the filing of the petition [the
bankrupt] could by any means have transferred or which
might have been levied upon and sold under judicial process
... )7,05 If, therefore, the "rights of action" include the right
to sue officers, directors and majority shareholders for breaches
of fiduciary duty, the creditors of the bankrupt corporation will
be the beneficiaries of this provision, and the officers, directors
or majority shareholders will indirectly be liable to corporate
creditors.
Before the creditors can make use of the trustee's ability
to sue in their behalf, though, a petition in bankruptcy must
be filed for the corporation. It is possible that the corporation
might voluntarily file its own petition in bankruptcy; but more
importantly, the creditors can, under proper circumstances,
initiate the proceedings themselves. Under the provisions of
the Bankruptcy Act, a creditor can force a business corpora-
tion 0 into bankruptcy if the corporation owes debts of $1,000
or more, if the creditor is able to get the prescribed number of
qualified creditors to join his petition0 7 and if the corporation
11 U.S.C. §§ 1-1255 (1970).
2 11 U.S.C. § 110(a) (1970).
.. 11 U.S.C. § 110(a) (5) (1970). Subsection (6) also vests in the trustee "rights
of action arising upon contracts, or usury, or on the unlawful taking or detention of or
injury to his property .... 11 U.S.C. § l10(a)(6) (1970).
21 11 U.S.C. § 22(b) (1970).
20 11 U.S.C. § 95(b) (1970). This section states "Three or more creditors who have
provable claims . . . amounting in the aggregate to $500 in excess of the value of any
securities held by them, or if all of the creditors of the person are less than twelve in
number, then one or more of the creditors whose claim or claims equal that amount
may file. .... "
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has committed an act of bankruptcy. 28 With respect to the
latter requirement, this can occur if the corporation, while in-
solvent, allows a lien obtained "through legal proceedings" to
remain undischarged for 30 days.08 Thus, a creditor often can
force a corporation into bankruptcy by reducing his debt to a
judgment and obtaining a judicial lien on the property of the
corporation. Thereafter three other creditors may join and su-
cessfully petition for the corporation to be judged bankrupt.210
In Kentucky it would appear that once the execution on the
judgment is delivered to the sheriff, a lien has attached to the
property of the debtor,2 1 and the failure to vacate that lien
within the prescribed time will create an act of bankruptcy as
against an insolvent debtor.
Once the corporation is ajudicated bankrupt, a trustee is
selected either by the creditors of the bankrupt or by the ref-
eree.212 It is his primary duty to "conserve and advance the
interests of the estate entrusted to him. .... ",213 Simply
stated, the trustee is charged with the duty to collect the assets
of the bankrupt and to make distributions from those assets to
the appropriate parties. " With the corporation properly-into
bankruptcy proceedings, either voluntarily or involuntarily,
the trustee can sue and recover against corporate officers,
directors and majority shareholders for violation of their fidu-
ciary duties resulting in injury to the corporation.2 5 Further, if
208 11 U.S.C. § 21(a) (1970). There are other "requirements" which must be met
before a creditor can successfully force a debtor into involuntary bankruptcy. For
example, a debtor-corporation must be a corporation that can be forced into involun-
tary bankruptcy. 11 U.S.C. § 21(b) (1970).
20 11 U.S.C. § 21(a)(3) (1970).
It is important to note that the Bankruptcy Rules preclude the creditor who
participated in the act of bankruptcy (in this example the creditor obtaining the lien
that remains unsatisfied) from being one of the three petitioners necessary to force the
corporation into involuntary bankruptcy under 11 U.S.C. § 95(b) (1970). See also
Bankruptcy Rules and Official Forms 104(b) (U.S.C.A. 1973).
211 KRS § 426.120 (1970).
212 11 U.S.C. § 72 (1970).
282 2 COLLER, supra note 47, at 1743.
214 See Maryland Cas. Co. v. Central Trust Co., 79 N.E.2d 253, 256 (N.Y. 1948).
One court has said that the trustee's "sole care should be to make the most out of the
estate, and that primarily in the interest of the creditors." In re Wresley Co., 133 F.
388, 390 (7th Cir. 1904).
25 See, e.g., Dwyer v. Tracey, 118 F. Supp. 289 (N.D. Ill. 1954). See also the cases
cited at C. NADLER, THE LAW OF BANKRuPTcY § 281 n.129 (2d ed. 1965).
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the trustee refuses to prosecute the cause of action, the credi-
tors can petition the bankruptcy court to compel the trustee to
take such action."' An excellent exposition of this right to sue,
as well as a discussion of the posture of the trustee, is found in
Gochenour v. Cleveland Terminals Building Co.2 17 where the
court stated:
The right of action of a corporation to recover damages be-
cause of the misconduct and neglect of duty of a corporate
officer passes to the trustee of a bankrupt corporation. If this
duty has been so violated as. . . to result in the impairment
of assets, of loss of property, or an officer, by misconduct,
makes a profit for himself at the expense of the corporation,
he may be compelled to make full restitution. . . and as the
corporation could have maintained a suit for reimbursement
from its officers for misconduct, the right of such an action
was an asset of the company and passed to the trustee in
bankruptcy.
The object of the Bankruptcy Act is to benefit creditors
by making all the pecuniary means and property of the bank-
rupt available to their payment and in furtherance of this
object, there passes to the trustee, not only what in strictness
may be called the property of the bankrupt, but also those
rights of action to which he was entitled for the purpose of
recovering real or personal property, or damages respecting
that which has been unlawfully diminished in value, with-
held or taken from him. 21
8
The impact of this on the concept of limited liability is
apparent. A creditor unable to extract payment from a corpora-
tion can generally force the debtor-corporation into bank-
ruptcy. The trustee then has the duty to sue any officer, direc-
tor or majority shareholder whose negligence has harmed the
corporation. Therefore, to the extent that the corporation's ina-
bility to pay is due to the negligence or the breach of fiduciary
duty of an officer, director or majority shareholder, the liability
of that person is not limited merely to his investment in the
corporation. Rather, his personal assets are exposed to the ex-
tent that his mismanagement caused harm to the corporation.
218 Gochenour v. Cleveland Terminals Bldg. Co., 118 F.2d 89 (6th Cir. 1941);
Gochenour v. George and Francis Ball Foundation, 35 F. Supp. 508 (S.D. Ind. 1940).
217 118 F.2d 89 (6th Cir. 1941).
21 Id. at 93.
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VI. CONCLUSION
In determining liability under a contract, basic principles
require the court to consider the expectations of the parties
involved. Accordingly, when deciding whether a corporation's
owner should be liable for a corporate obligation, the reasona-
ble expectations of the party contracting with the corporation
are critical. By disregarding the corporate entity in appropriate
instances and enforcing fiduciary duties in favor of creditors,
courts can protect the reasonable expectation of the party con-
tracting with the corporation and thereby insure fairness.
As stated earlier, one who contracts with a corporation
reasonably expects that the corporation will be adequately cap-
italized and that representations made to him are truthful. If
these reasonable expectations are defeated by the owners of the
corporation, the owners should be denied the protection of lim-
ited liability. This is the proper use of the concept of disregard-
ing the corporate entity.
After the obligation is incurred, an owner of a corporation
should be denied limited liability if that owner's negligence or
unfairness has caused the corporation's inability to meet its
obligation. This proposition is supported by two rationales.
The first is that one contracting with a corporation has a rea-
sonable expectation that the corporation will be run in a fair
and non-negligent fashion. If this expectation is not met, lim-
ited liability should be denied. The other justification, some-
what related to the first, is based on the need to fairly appor-
tion losses. If a creditor fails to receive his payment because of
the negligence of the owner (or director or officer) of a corpora-
tion, the court is required to determine who is to bear that loss.
If the corporate entity is respected, it will be borne by the
creditor; if the corporate entity is disregarded, it will be borne
by the negligent owner. Absent a strong policy reason to the
contrary, the more blameworthy party - the negligent owner
- should bear the loss. This fair apportionment of loss can be
effected in almost every case by enforcing a fiduciary duty in
favor of creditors.
1975]
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